SMA Publications

Authors: LTG (Ret), Dr. Dennis Gyllensporre (Swedish Defence University); MG (Ret) Bengt Svensson, Swedish Defence University

This publication was released as part of the SMA project “21st Century Strategic Deterrence Frameworks.” (SDF) For more information regarding this project, please click here.

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This non-paper, prepared at the Swedish Defence University (SEDU), investigates the dynamics of deterrence in cooperation with the U.S.1 It is crafted for the SMA audience, providing preliminary insights into collaborative efforts within ID and emphasizing the value of partner contributions. The document utilizes international relations theories to explore effective engagement strategies in ID, laying the groundwork for in-depth discussions on pivotal topics related to partner involvement. The content encompasses a brief overview of theories and concepts, setting the stage to address the following inquiries:

• What does integration signify in the context of deterrence?
• What are the objectives of integration in this context?
• What are the essential means and ways to attain the objectives?
• What prerequisites are essential for successful integration?

This publication was released as part of the SMA project “21st Century Strategic Deterrence Frameworks.” (SDF) For more information regarding this project, please click here.

Authors: Dr. Kyle Beardsley (Duke University), Dr. Jonathan Wilkenfeld (START University of Maryland), & Phuong Pham (Duke University)

This publication was released as part of the SMA project “21st Century Strategic Deterrence Frameworks.” (SDF) For more information regarding this project, please click here.

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This report evaluates how crisis actors respond to adversary actions in the early stages of an international crisis. We specifically consider the first three stages of a crisis: the trigger act from a challenger, the response act from the defender state which has been triggered, and then the counter-response
act from the challenger (see Figure 1). The latter two stages constitute the outcomes of interest: the defender’s response to a challenge and the challenger’s counter-response to a defender’s response. The propensity for defenders to respond with violence or for challengers to counter-respond with violence, we contend, should depend on their adversaries’ prior actions—respectively, the challenger’s use of a violent or non-violent trigger and the defender’s use of a violent or non-violent response. Moreover, we consider how observed characteristics of the adversary related to attributes such as military capabilities, alliance military capacity, and domestic instability condition the relationship between prior actions and actor responses.

This publication was released as part of the SMA project “21st Century Strategic Deterrence Frameworks.” (SDF) For more information regarding this project, please click here.

Author: Dr. Tom Tyler (Yale University)

This publication was released as part of the SMA project “21st Century Strategic Deterrence Frameworks.” (SDF) For more information regarding this project, please click here.

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This review focuses on research findings about the effectiveness of the perceived risk of sanctions on criminal behavior. The goal of this review is to help policymakers understand the basic conclusions to be drawn from the large empirical literature on whether and when the possibility of sanctions or incentives shapes the frequency with which people violate rules. The key conclusion is that deterrence can and frequently does shape people’s behavior, with perceived certainty of punishment being the most important factor shaping what people do. A variety of background factors shape the strength of this relationship. While deterrence does “work” researchers suggest that it is a costly mechanism to achieve minor gains in compliance; other approaches are as powerful or more powerful and have lower costs.

This publication was released as part of the SMA project “21st Century Strategic Deterrence Frameworks.” (SDF) For more information regarding this project, please click here.

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Author: Dr. Sabrina Polansky (NSI, Inc.)

This publication was released as part of the SMA project “21st Century Strategic Deterrence Frameworks.” (SDF) For more information regarding this project, please click here.

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This work was situated within the broader Strategic Multilayer Assessment Strategic Deterrence Frameworks (SDF) study, which incorporated four lines of effort (LOEs) and was initiated at the request of US Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM). The present LOE4 study was oriented around two guiding questions in a supplementary project request letter signed by US European Command (EUCOM) Deputy Commander, Lieutenant General Steven Basham: 1) How does USEUCOM deter with and through allies and partners as part of integrated deterrence? and 2) What is the optimal balance of US and ally commitment and capability to maintain an effective deterrent to aggression in Europe?

This study conceptualizes integrated deterrence as incorporating multiple elements, including coordination that occurs across domains, capabilities, or instruments of national power, among allies and partners, and across geographies—emphasizing the latter two elements. The study was contextualized to a three-peer deterrence problem, for which we explored three aspects: signaling, challenges and opportunities, and resources required for effective deterrence.

Twenty-two experts were interviewed for this study under the Chatham House Rule. Participants represented the perspectives of 13 countries and subject matter expertise on Russia, China, and hybrid threats. A participant summary can be found in the tables to the right. Country experts were drawn from four categories: 1) retired generals or admirals at think tanks or individual countries’ war colleges, 2) current military officers (US equivalent O-6 and above), 3) country subject matter experts, including non-government experts, and 4) National Liaison Officers. Interviews were conducted in two rounds to enable the team to gather initial insights, determine topics for further exploration, identify any gaps in knowledge or understanding, and allow for question refinement based on initial findings and USEUCOM feedback.

Desk research was conducted to provide a basis for study and question development, guide study interviews, and inform analysis. Analysis was conducted on over 250 pages of interview transcripts to develop an appropriate framework in which to organize and contextualize the experts’ rich and wide-ranging insights. While experts’ opinions varied, this variation typically reflected nuance along a conceptual spectrum rather than opposing schools of thought. There was a great deal of convergence across the experts’ inputs, not only within this study but also coherent with study findings from other LOEs in the broader SDF project. The current analysis yielded seven key themes, the content of which reflect the experts’ insights and recommendations and are elaborated below. For clarity of presentation, the experts’ ideas are stated in a straightforward, declarative way (i.e., most sentences will not begin with “the experts indicated…”); all assertions not otherwise cited thus represent the study experts’ statements and suggestions rather than the present author’s. Themes 1-3 broadly capture the necessary prerequisites for effective integrated deterrence, while themes 4-6 focus on execution, and the central focus of theme 7 is forward-looking. There are significant connections across themes.

This publication was released as part of the SMA project "21st Century Strategic Deterrence Frameworks." (SDF) For more information regarding this project, please click here.

Authors: Bob Williams (Georgetown University) & Dr. James Giordano (Georgetown University Medical Center)

This publication was released as part of the SMA project “21st Century Strategic Deterrence Frameworks.” (SDF) For more information regarding this project, please click here.

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Quite recently, nuclear strategy scholars Kier Lieber and Daryl Press posited that arms’ tables have turned, citing the asymmetry of limited nuclear powers as a reboot of the United States (US)-North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) tactical nuclear playbook during the Cold War. Their key message—that “The United States must take seriously the nuclear capabilities and resolve of its foes”—isn’t lost on us: we previously called for the need to begin serious counter-weapons of mass destruction (WMD) planning for adversarial use of nuclear weapons below the threshold of Armageddon. We must raise an objection, however, to the assertion that states with limited nuclear capabilities are reprising the US’ 20th century strategy of coercion and dissuasion with their handfuls of weapons. Instead, we see a world wherein not only Russia and China, but militarily asymmetrical nuclear aspirants, such as North Korea and Iran, increase their resolve to employ nuclear threats to gain concessions outside previously conceived escalation ladders.

American adversaries—and the foes of US allies under the nuclear umbrella—cannot rationally threaten a massive nuclear strike and expect to benefit militarily after certain retaliation. This classic model of deterring behavior through assured failure, if not complete destruction, was emblematic of the
dyadic US-Soviet relationship that endured for the Cold War. As Lieber and Press describe in their most recent article, The Return of Nuclear Escalation, the US-NATO strategy for so-called “tactical” nuclear weapons in Europe was spawned from a desire to avoid direct intercontinental exchanges, and
either dissuade any territorial aggression toward NATO or at least coerce Moscow into halting a conventional campaign. Per that theory, a few short-range, lower-yield weapons would be
enough to demonstrate American resolve to alliance commitments without immediately escalating to mutual destruction.

We posit that more so today than in the last century, the rise of the nuclear taboo, at least among Western democracies, and fear of retaliation from even singular nuclear use reinforces the dissuasion of first strike doctrine. The desire to avoid any nuclear attacks on one’s homeland was determined early in the nuclear age to underpin the fruitlessness inherent in nuclear exchange. At least among those states on parity to exchange volumes of nuclear weapons, certain resort to conventional war was the only rational choice. So arose the Atomic Age mantra of nuclear war as unwinnable from the start, as Bernard Brodie suggested as early as 1946,8 and a clamoring chorus that “the ever-diminishing plausibility of the nuclear threat and ever bolder challenges to make good on it,” as Morgenthau wrote in 1964,9 itself voids the proposed value of deterrence.

James Giordano’s work is supported in part by federal funds from Award UL1TR001409 from the National Center for Advancing Translational Sciences (NCATS), National Institutes of Health, through the Clinical and Translational Science Awards Program (CTSA), a trademark of the Department of Health and Human Services, part of the Roadmap Initiative, “Re-Engineering the Clinical Research Enterprise”; National Sciences Foundation Award 2113811 – Amendment ID 001; the Henry Jackson Foundation for Military Medicine; the Strategic Multilayer Assessment Branch of the Joint Staff, and US Strategic Command, Pentagon; the Institute for Biodefense Research; the Simon Center for the Professional Military Ethic, United States Military Academy, West Point, NY, USA, and Leadership Initiatives

Link to Publication:

LinkClick.aspx (army.mil)

This publication was released as part of the SMA project “21st Century Strategic Deterrence Frameworks.” (SDF) For more information regarding this project, please click here.

Author: NATO Allied Command Transformation

This publication was released as part of the SMA project “21st Century Strategic Deterrence Frameworks.” (SDF) For more information regarding this project, please click here.

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The Strategic Foresight Analysis 2023 (SFA23) provides a shared understanding of the Evolving Security Environment to 2043, thus establishing the context for Allied futures thinking. Based on this context, the Future Operating Environment 2024 (FOE24) will address the military problem sets for Allied Warfare Development. FOE24 will also serve as a baseline for further conceptual and strategic thinking. The renewed foresight cycle, consisting of SFA23, FOE24 and deployable foresight analytics capacities, will facilitate collective futures thinking within the Alliance, as well as augment individual Ally’s foresight capabilities.

Since the publication of SFA17, the security environment has been gravely altered, profoundly shaped by the systemic shocks posed by the COVID pandemic and Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The years ahead will be most likely characterized by further strategic shocks and structural disruptions, driven by actors and structural forces alike. The international order is in transition and will become increasingly multipolar amidst intensifying great power competition and fragmentation at all levels. Pervasive competition is unfolding and spreading into new domains through all dimensions at all times. Strategic competitors will engage across a blurred continuum of competition at the global, regional and sub-regional, state as well as non-state levels.

SFA23 concludes that the competition and adversarial intent of major state actors and terrorist non-state actors will endure amidst disruptions, and will aim to shape and contest the Alliance, as well as challenge the rules-based international order (RBIO). These actors will continue attempting to accumulate their own power and expand influence through exploiting instabilities and leveraging alternative digital, socio-economic and hybrid means.

The report presents its research findings in three main areas: the Evolving Security Environment, the seven drivers of change, and initial implications to the Alliance for the Instruments of Power. Additionally, its research context is established in the Four Worlds model scenarios. Essentially, the report focuses on the overall trajectories and confluence of the key drivers of change, identifying potential strategic shocks for each, and determines the Alliance`s Evolving Security Environment in relation to its Instruments of Power. The seven interconnected drivers shaping the Evolving Security Environment are depicted in Figure 1.

The SFA2023 report can be downloaded here or from the Strategic Foresight Analysis webpage.

This publication was released as part of the SMA project “21st Century Strategic Deterrence Frameworks.” (SDF) For more information regarding this project, please click here.

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Author: Mr. Jason Healey (Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs)

This publication was released as part of the SMA project “21st Century Strategic Deterrence Frameworks.” (SDF) For more information regarding this project, please click here.

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The United States needs more effective metrics to determine if integrated cyber deterrence is working (as called for in the 2023 cyber strategy for the Department of Defense (DOD)) as expected and to separate these effects from those of improving the overall defensibility of the Internet (as called for in the White House’s National Cybersecurity Strategy). Fortunately, cyber deterrence is not like nuclear deterrence. Because of repeated interactions over time, it should be possible to measure to what degree deterrence is working to moderate the behavior of nation-state threat actors, not just–as with nuclear weapons–when it has failed.

This paper briefly examines the history of active cyber defense and deterrence, as well as earlier ideas on measuring effectiveness of cyber deterrence, before proposing new frameworks to measure if US government efforts at integrated deterrence and defensibility are succeeding at the strategic level. The main framework is based on relatively simple curves of adversary activity over time. In brief, measures to improve defensibility might be working if there is a downward trend (or decrease in slope) in the frequency and severity of general cybersecurity incidents. Such a decrease would likely tell us little about the success of integrated deterrence, which would require a downward trend (or decrease in slope) of frequency and severity of incidents by determined state threat actors.

If integrated deterrence is as successful a strategy as anticipated by DOD, the impact should be substantial enough to show up as a strong downward turn. Anything less may suggest that a strategy of integrated deterrence is insufficient and may need to be bolstered, supplemented with other strategies, or replaced. Without trendlines, DOD and policymakers cannot easily know. Though this approach may seem obvious, there have been few serious efforts, at least outside of classified channels.

This publication was released as part of the SMA project “21st Century Strategic Deterrence Frameworks.” (SDF) For more information regarding this project, please click here.

Authors: The Media Ecology and Strategy Analysis Group (MESA)

Research Team Members: Dr. Skye Cooley (Oklahoma State University); Dr. Sumin Shin (Oklahoma State University); Dr. Aysa Cooley (Oklahoma State University); Dr. Rosemary Avance (Oklahoma State University)

Student Researchers: Dru Norton, Kelli Leech, Campbell Clark

This publication was released as part of the SMA project “21st Century Strategic Deterrence Frameworks.” (SDF) For more information regarding this project, please click here.

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This project examines global perspectives on evolving nuclear challenges and deterrence approaches by analyzing discourse across media, arms control experts, and social platforms in major nuclear-armed nations. Using computational analysis and qualitative coding, it compiles insights from news articles, arms control blogs, and Twitter commentary over the past decade. The goal is to gain an expansive view of public conversations regarding nuclear weapons issues to inform strategic planning and assessment of the strategic environment. By compiling diverse qualitative data points, the project aims to identify areas of alignment and mismatch between official deterrence policies and public discourse that could illuminate whether existing strategies sufficiently account for media, arms control experts, and public perceptions of emergent risks. The key findings include:

Discussion Trends and Global Landscape:

• Recent discussions on integrated nuclear warfare show a notably negative trend surpassing expected pessimism levels.
• The emotional nature of discussions reflects mixed optimistic and pessimistic views, with limited neutrality.
• China and the US dominate news and arms control blogs; India and Pakistan feature in hybrid warfare Twitter posts.
• Ukraine’s prominence emphasizes fears of nuclear catastrophe due to Russian aggression.
• Most nations receive consistently positive coverage for navigating integrated warfare complexities.
• Positive depiction suggests well-received efforts in managing evolving security challenges.
• Different countries have distinct nuclear weapon concerns; the global landscape is marked by crises and power competition.

Term Associations and Social Media Patterns:

• Term associations were analyzed across news, blogs, and Twitter data.
• “Nuclear war” co-occurs frequently with “sanctions” and “arms race,” linking conflicts to economic and military strategies.
• “Deterrence” is linked to “nuclear war” and “sanctions,” highlighting its assumed ties to aggression prevention.
• “Hypersonic missiles” and “AI” interactions are sparse.
• “Deterrence” and “nuclear war” often co-occur in social media, suggesting correlations.
• “Artificial intelligence” and “deterrence” are relevant.
• “Cyber warfare” and “information warfare” converge.

Multipolar Power Competition:

• Multi-crisis landscape coincides with a shift towards multipolar power competition.
• Technological and political shifts spawn both advancements and global threats.
• The dichotomy of Western liberalism fuels achievements and challenges.
• Multipolar power competition hastens global challenges, including nuclear arms control.
• The rise of multipolar power competition destabilizes, revealing global disparities.

Hybrid Warfare and Challenges:

• Hybrid warfare emerges, enabled by technology and economic interconnectivity.
• Hybrid activities blur lines between conflict and below-threshold operations.
• Cyber warfare targets include military systems, energy grids, and nuclear command structures.
• “Nuclear entanglement” has arisen with cyber incursions potentially causing nuclear escalation.
• An erosion of trust among global powers is hampering arms control and norms.

New Arms Race and Escalation Concerns:

• A new arms race, tied to technology and mistrust, is underway with advanced weapons.
• Russia and China are developing next-gen nuclear weaponry with unique capabilities.
• Low-yield nuclear weapons are blurring the line between conventional and nuclear forces.
• An increased risk of fantastical weapons with hypersonic speeds and enhanced evasion abilities.
• Overt nuclear threats are more frequent and reflect broader fears and instabilities.
• An erosion of arms control architecture contributes to dangerous escalations.

The Complexity of Nuclear Decision-Making:

• Nuclear weapons decision-making is complex, involving political, conventional, and strategic considerations.
• US decision-making is mainly political, with limited checks on Presidential orders.
• China maintains a “no first use” policy, focusing on defensive posture and disarmament.
• Russia and the US are more ambiguous on usage, facing challenges from new technologies.
• India, Pakistan, and AUKUS alliance add complexity to deterrence strategies.
• Integration of AI and cyber capabilities raise new risks in nuclear conflicts.

Challenges in Addressing Arms Control:

• The international system fails to address the risks of an arms race and nuclear enhancements.
• The UN is ineffective in regulating nuclear armament and the degradation of global conditions.
• Disarmament organizations struggle to convert public opinion into action.
• Lack of attention to nuclear threats due to broader meta-crises like climate change, conflicts, and terrorism.
• Pathways for arms control are needed, including a comprehensive treaty to account for emerging capabilities.
• Transparency is crucial to build trust and facilitate international cooperation.

Conclusions:

• There is an urgent need for a coordinated international response to nuclear proliferation and arms race escalations.
• The study findings emphasize the need for transparency, public support, and cooperation among nations to reduce the threats of nuclear warfare.

This publication was released as part of the SMA project “21st Century Strategic Deterrence Frameworks.” (SDF) For more information regarding this project, please click here.

Author: Dr. James Giordano (Georgetown University Medical Center)

This publication was released as part of the SMA project “21st Century Strategic Deterrence Frameworks.” (SDF) For more information regarding this project, please click here.

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The twentieth century evidenced the increasing use of state-of-the-art science and technology (S&T) in warfare. Included in this S&T armamentarium were new chemical and biological agents that could be yoked to extant forms of S&T (e.g., aircraft, ordnance, etc.) to facilitate delivery in kinetic engagements. Such changes in the instruments of warfare served as impetus for formulating international signatory treaties and conventions (e.g., The Chemical Weapons Convention [CWC] and Biological Toxins and
Weapons Convention [BTWC]) to govern these agents’ development and use. However, recent
advancements and interdisciplinary convergence in chemical, biological, data, computational, and engineering fields have enabled creation of chembio agents that are not (currently) regulated by these governances and, when taken together, can establish significant deterrent leverage in nonkinetic and kinetic domains.

This paper relied in part on research conducted for the Strategic Multilayer Assessment Branch of the Joint Staff, J-3.

Link to Publication:

hdiac.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/HDIAC_2024_Vol_8_No_1_web_final.pdf

This publication was released as part of the SMA project “21st Century Strategic Deterrence Frameworks.” (SDF) For more information regarding this project, please click here.

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‍Author: Egle Murauskaite (University of Maryland)

This publication was released as part of the SMA project “21st Century Strategic Deterrence Frameworks.” (SDF) For more information regarding this project, please click here.

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After decades of discourse on disarmament and non-proliferation, the war in Ukraine has effectively marked the return of nuclear weapons to both mainstream public rhetoric and military-policy planning, and highlighted the growing importance of strategic deterrence. Russia’s progressively more intense nuclear saber-rattling over the past decade is partly due to an updated NATO posture and gradual commitments by Western nuclear powers to update their arsenals. While Western analysts have consistently reported seeing few substantive changes on the ground to accompany Russian verbiage, the escalatory pattern is frequently compared to the Cuban missile crisis at the height of the Cold War. In contrast, the Eastern European Baltic states, typically at the forefront of Russia’s containment agenda, consider Russia’s nuclear rhetoric with seemingly little concern, discounting the threats as empty. A regularly under-appreciated product of differing Cold War experiences, the gap between these divergent transatlantic perspectives has barely changed despite substantial changes to the geopolitical situation against which the nuclear rhetoric has sounded.

This paper traces and compares the transatlantic perceptions of Russia’s nuclear rhetoric from the start of the conflict in Ukraine in 2014 to the latest round of escalatory threats issued in early 2023. It is based on a review of open-source literature, public opinion polls, and interviews with security experts previously conducted by the author. The paper starts with an outline of transatlantic positions based on previous research and proceeds to present a detailed narrative comparison in the context of Russia’s conventional war in Ukraine that started in February 2022.

This publication was released as part of the SMA project “21st Century Strategic Deterrence Frameworks.” (SDF) For more information regarding this project, please click here.