SMA Publications

Editors: Nicholas Wright (Georgetown University, University College London, Center for Strategic and International Studies), Michael Miklaucic (National Defense University), Todd Veazie (Joint Staff Strategic Multilayer Assessment Office)

Publication Preview

Air University Press has published Strategic Multilayer Assessment’s (SMA) latest book, Human, Machine, War: How the Mind-Tech Nexus Will Win Future Wars.

Forewords by General James E. Rainey (Commander, US Army Futures Command) and Sir Lawrence Freedman (Emeritus Professor of War Studies, King’s College London).

Contributing authors include James Giordano, Lauren Kahn, Sir David Omand, Andrew Gainer, Karl Van Orden, Jaime Lukos, Timothy Grayson, Michael Groen, Jack Shanahan, William Casebeer, David Huberdeau, Samuel Bendett, Josh Baughman, Ben Connable, Aaron Frank, and David Vernal.

Military and strategic success depends not on minds or technology but on the combination of minds plus technology. We call this combination the Mind-Tech Nexus, which we define as how human factors (e.g., will to fight, skill, daring, perception) will interface and converge with the technologies of our time (e.g., digital, artificial intelligence, quantum computing, neuroscience) to help shape the character and the outcomes of competition. This volume brings together world-leading scholars and practitioners to explore how minds and technology are being—and can be—harnessed for military and geostrategic power.

Edited by Nicholas Wright, Michael Miklaucic, Todd Veazie

ISBN: 978-1-58566-334-7

The book can also be downloaded from Air University Press alongside other great publications.

The views expressed in this volume are those of the authors and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.

Author: Dr. Samuel Henkin (NSI, Inc.)

This publication was released as part of the SMA project “Anticipating the Future Operational Environment (AFOE) Phase III.“ For more information regarding this project, please click here.

Publication Preview

The West Africa Exploitable Conditions Model (WAECM) is an empirical, concept-based, system-of systems model tailored to the region of West Africa, as defined by USAFRICOM’s interactive AOR map (https://www.africom.mil/military-presence). Developed from the AFRICOM Exploitable Conditions Model (AECM), it identifies various variables or factors (nodes) and their linkages through direct connections to one another (edges), representing the complex conditions and dynamics of the OE in West Africa.

While the AECM is broadly applicable to the countries comprising West Africa, the WAECM incorporates regional model tailoring to account for specific West African conditions and regional dynamics—including key characteristics, attributes, and/or contexts—ensuring relevance and responsiveness to regional complexities.

The WAECM, consisting of 157 nodes and 1,067 edges, offers a systems view of the complex, interrelated conditions in the region, encompassing economics; energy; environment and climate change; technology, communication, and information; military and security; societal conditions; and governance factors.

As a thinking tool, the WAECM aims to improve a user’s ability to identify and understand critical conditions and dynamics of complex systems in West Africa; anticipate their impacts and effects; and, ultimately, devise ways to address them to produce desired outcomes. During the model development process, the research team also explored select critical conditions relevant to the political stability of West Africa, the initial findings of which are presented in the story map featured in Part II.

This publication was released as part of the SMA project “Anticipating the Future Operational Environment (AFOE) Phase III.“ For more information regarding this project, please click here.

Authors: Dr. Asya Cooley (Oklahoma State University); Dr. Skye Cooley (Oklahoma State University); Dr. Rosemary Avance (Oklahoma State University); Dr. Sumin Shin (Oklahoma State University)

This publication was released as part of the SMA project “21st Century Strategic Deterrence Frameworks.” (SDF) For more information regarding this project, please click here.

Publication Preview

This comprehensive qualitative analysis examines the evolution of Russian articulations of deterrence by analyzing over 250 Russian military documents spanning from the Soviet era to the present. The research
identifies seven periods that reflect paradigmatic shifts in the intellectual discourse of Russian military strategists regarding deterrence. These periods are not rigidly defined but serve as markers for transformations in military thinking. The analysis is supported by insights from relevant academic
literature.

• The first period, from 1954 to 1959, witnessed a transformative phase as the Russian armed forces acquired nuclear weaponry, leading to significant shifts in perspectives on conflicts and military operations.
• The second period, from the 1960s to the 1970s, was characterized by a fervent nuclear arms race and a comprehensive restructuring of the Russian armed forces to balance the role of nuclear missile weaponry.
• The third period, from the 1970s to 1991, focused on attaining nuclear parity with potential adversaries and viewing strategic nuclear weapons primarily as tools for deterrence rather than actual weapons of combat.
• The fourth period, from the 1990s to the 2000s, explored the challenge of deterring conventional threats using nuclear weapons, particularly when Russia’s conventional capabilities were significantly inferior. The concept of de-escalation1 emerged as a strategic approach during this period.
• In the fifth period, from the 2000s to the 2010s, Russian military thinkers shifted their attention to strategic deterrence, which encompassed both nuclear and conventional capabilities to counterthreats of various natures.
• The sixth period, from the 2010s to the 2020s, introduced the concept of cross-domain deterrence, recognizing the limitations of nuclear deterrence and exploring a broader framework that includes non-nuclear and informational influence domains. The current emerging period, referred to as hybrid strategic deterrence, is characterized by Russia’s focus on countering pressure from the US through its military capabilities, collaboration with allies, and anticipation of emerging disruptive technologies. Hybrid strategic deterrence involves a range of implicit coercive measures to counter hybrid warfare, combining both forceful and non-forceful influences.

This project also investigates contrasting perspectives between Russia and the United States (and the West) regarding deterrence, according to Russian military documents. The US military organization is portrayed as aggressive and interventionist, while Russia is seen as peaceful. The US aims to maintain global dominance and the ability to launch nuclear strikes against countries that challenge its hegemony. On the other hand, Russian deterrence focuses on protecting national security rather than pursuing expansionist goals. Military theorists argue against large-scale reductions in nuclear weapons, suggesting that they encourage aggressive plans by the US and pose a threat to global security. Another point of contention is the purpose of strategic weapons, with one document asserting that US missile defense systems are not solely defensive but rather are hazardous components of offensive capabilities. Contrasts also arise in understandings of nuclear de-escalation, with the US shown as relying on conventional military superiority and the possibility of nuclear escalation if faced with deescalation. Additionally, Russian military theorists perceive the deployment of US missile defense systems as encirclement strategies targeting Russia and China, although this does not cause substantial concern in the US.

This research also addresses effective and ineffective deterrence from the Russian perspective. Russian military discussions place great emphasis on the effectiveness of deterrence, with a focus on nuclear status. Effective deterrence, according to texts, requires a clear understanding of red lines, the ability to respond with overwhelming losses to the aggressor, and the persuasiveness of determination to fulfill obligations. The role of nuclear weapons is seen as crucial for Russia, deterring both nuclear and conventional conflicts, preventing large-scale wars, and ensuring international stability. However, the development of precision weapons, information warfare, and new physical principles may reduce the role of nuclear deterrence in the future. Non-nuclear deterrence is also considered effective, with regional commands increasing flexibility, but proper political and diplomatic support is essential. Asymmetric responses are seen as valuable tools for deterrence. Ineffective deterrence challenges include limitations against major geopolitical centers, ineffectiveness in preventing conflicts and addressing new threats, and diminished effectiveness due to the deployment of US missile defense systems, which disrupt the strategic balance and risk catastrophe.

Overall, this analysis demonstrates the evolution of Russian understandings of deterrence and highlights the importance of nuclear and non-nuclear capabilities, as well as information warfare, in shaping Russia’s strategic thinking. It underscores the significance of adapting to changing geopolitical dynamics and technological advancements to maintain effective deterrence strategies.

This publication was released as part of the SMA project “21st Century Strategic Deterrence Frameworks.” (SDF) For more information regarding this project, please click here.

Author: Dr. Nicholas Wright (Intelligent Biology)

This publication was released as part of the SMA project “21st Century Strategic Deterrence Frameworks.” (SDF) For more information regarding this project, please click here.

Publication Preview

The Joint Concept for Competing (JCC; Feb 2023) states that a ‘competitive mindset also means embracing strategic competition as a persistent and enduring national security challenge.’ That requires anticipating future change as adversaries respond to us, and we to them. Iteration. Yet although potential futures rapidly become impossibly numerous to analyse, and are in many ways unprestatable, we can identify regularities significant for deterrence planning.

Humans are notoriously bad, for example, at anticipating their own decision-making in the future. Not only do human preferences and perceptions change over time, but specific actions like going to war reliably change them in ways that humans systematically ignore. Planners often anticipate that a ‘war will be over by Christmas’—and yet once thousands have died on each side preferences change.
Thus, here we ask: How can we put ourselves in the shoes of our adversaries—and of ourselves—on Day 30, Day 100, or Day 1000 of deterrence operations?

We combine the latest evidence from neuroscience and artificial intelligence (AI) with psychology, business, intelligence analysis and other disciplines. This identifies operationalizable ways that analysts and strategists can: (1) better forecast decision calculus assessments; and (2) integrate these decision calculi within a new conception of planning for deterrence—and influence more broadly—in campaigns.

‍

Volume V in the SMA Perspectives Series “Emergent Issues for U.S. National Security”

Editors: Dr. Lawrence Kuznar (NSI, Inc.), Dr. Belinda Bragg (NSI, Inc.), Dr. Hriar “Doc” Cabayan (Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory), Nathan Heath (NSI, Inc)

Publication Preview

The context of this Report has to do with Russia’s use of nuclear ambiguity and implied nuclear threats leading up to and after its invasion of Ukraine—specifically, threats to escalate to the use of low-yield nuclear weapons to support conventional offensive operations for political or economic gains. It examines the implications of Russia’s behavior beyond the Ukraine conflict, in particular, what lessons might other actors have taken away from the Ukraine war regarding the utility of threatening the use of low-yield nuclear weapons. We have intentionally cast a wide net to include a diverse set of perspectives on a range of actors. More specific questions of interest for this volume include, among others:

• the contours of Russia’s coercion mechanism, ultimate goals, and the subsequent emergence of new norms;
• lessons learned by various observers, such as the role of nuclear weapons, self-deterrence, and the subsequent emergence of new partnerships;
• China’s decision to field a substantial nuclear capability and the possibility of nuclear use in the event of a Cross-Strait conflict;
• what the United States and Japan should do to enhance the credibility of deterrence against China and how to reduce Chinese incentives to use military force; and
• the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s (DPRK’s) embrace of a new Cold War paradigm and its break with past strategic ambiguity.

The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.

About the SMA Perspectives Series “Emergent Issues for U.S. National Security”

The Joint Staff and the United States military adhere to the maxim that effective strategy formulation starts with a proper diagnosis of the environment. This is particularly true when the operational environment has high levels of interactive complexity across various domains. In these settings there are no easy choices, but we know from centuries of experience that the best plans are informed by thoughtful, disciplined exploration of ideas and diversity of thought. In pursuit of this axiom, the volumes in the SMA Perspectives Series are a concerted effort to harvest the informed opinions of leading experts but do not represent the policies or positions of the U.S. government. Our hope is that the ideas presented in this series expand the readers’ strategic horizons and inform better strategic choices.

Volume I: Present and Future Challenges to Maintaining Balance Between Global Cooperation and Competition

Volume II: US versus China: Promoting ‘Constructive Competition’ to Avoid ‘Destructive Competition’

Volume III: Emerging Strategic & Geopolitical Challenges: Operational Implications for US Commands

Volume IV: U.S. Command Perspectives on Campaigning in Support of Integrated Deterrence

Authors: Dr. Asya Cooley (Oklahoma State University); Dr. Skye Cooley (Oklahoma State University); Dr. Rosemary Avance (Oklahoma State University); Dr. Sumin Shin (Oklahoma State University)

This publication was released as part of the SMA project “21st Century Strategic Deterrence Frameworks.” (SDF) For more information regarding this project, please click here.

Publication Preview

This literature review analyzes the evolution of US deterrence theory and policy from 1945 to the present day. It is organized into five “waves” representing different eras:

• Wave 1 (1945-1955): The advent of nuclear weapons led to policies of massive retaliation and brinkmanship. Game theory and ideas of nuclear optimism shaped early Cold War thinking.
• Wave 2 (1955-1972): With rising Soviet capabilities, the US adopted flexible response doctrines like mutual assured destruction (MAD). Arms control efforts emerged but the nuclear arms race continued.
• Wave 3 (1972-1991): Détente and increased focus on nonproliferation characterized this period. The superpowers pursued measured deterrence based on parity and proportionality.
• Wave 4 (1991-2010): The post-Cold War period saw deterrence applied to rogue states and non-state actors like terrorist groups. Tailored deterrence became prevalent.
• Wave 5 (2010-present): Contemporary challenges have catalyzed new concepts like integrated deterrence and hybrid deterrence to address multifaceted threats.

Each wave arose from distinct geopolitical circumstances. As technologies and global dynamics shifted, so too did deterrence frameworks. Despite adaptations, limitations persist in reactive policies and the inhibiting nature of deterrence-dominant strategies. Understanding this complex evolution of deterrence thought is vital for informing effective policy today.

This publication was released as part of the SMA project “21st Century Strategic Deterrence Frameworks.” (SDF) For more information regarding this project, please click here.

Author: Dr. Tomas Ries (National Defence College, Stockholm, Sweden)

This publication was released as part of the SMA project “21st Century Strategic Deterrence Frameworks.” (SDF) For more information regarding this project, please click here.

Publication Preview

Table 1 (see next page) outlines seven areas in which the Russian leadership holds key values in the Arctic and High North. It offers a rough range of things/interests that the West could threaten in order to deter Russian aggression. The most important are outlined below in the text below.

This publication was released as part of the SMA project “21st Century Strategic Deterrence Frameworks.” (SDF) For more information regarding this project, please click here.

Authors: Bob Williams (Georgetown University) & Dr. James Giordano (Georgetown University Medical Center)

This publication was released as part of the SMA project “21st Century Strategic Deterrence Frameworks.” (SDF) For more information regarding this project, please click here.

Publication Preview

Quite recently, nuclear strategy scholars Kier Lieber and Daryl Press posited that arms’ tables have turned, citing the asymmetry of limited nuclear powers as a reboot of the United States (US)-North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) tactical nuclear playbook during the Cold War. Their key message—that “The United States must take seriously the nuclear capabilities and resolve of its foes”—isn’t lost on us: we previously called for the need to begin serious counter-weapons of mass destruction (WMD) planning for adversarial use of nuclear weapons below the threshold of Armageddon. We must raise an objection, however, to the assertion that states with limited nuclear capabilities are reprising the US’ 20th century strategy of coercion and dissuasion with their handfuls of weapons. Instead, we see a world wherein not only Russia and China, but militarily asymmetrical nuclear aspirants, such as North Korea and Iran, increase their resolve to employ nuclear threats to gain concessions outside previously conceived escalation ladders.

American adversaries—and the foes of US allies under the nuclear umbrella—cannot rationally threaten a massive nuclear strike and expect to benefit militarily after certain retaliation. This classic model of deterring behavior through assured failure, if not complete destruction, was emblematic of the
dyadic US-Soviet relationship that endured for the Cold War. As Lieber and Press describe in their most recent article, The Return of Nuclear Escalation, the US-NATO strategy for so-called “tactical” nuclear weapons in Europe was spawned from a desire to avoid direct intercontinental exchanges, and
either dissuade any territorial aggression toward NATO or at least coerce Moscow into halting a conventional campaign. Per that theory, a few short-range, lower-yield weapons would be
enough to demonstrate American resolve to alliance commitments without immediately escalating to mutual destruction.

We posit that more so today than in the last century, the rise of the nuclear taboo, at least among Western democracies, and fear of retaliation from even singular nuclear use reinforces the dissuasion of first strike doctrine. The desire to avoid any nuclear attacks on one’s homeland was determined early in the nuclear age to underpin the fruitlessness inherent in nuclear exchange. At least among those states on parity to exchange volumes of nuclear weapons, certain resort to conventional war was the only rational choice. So arose the Atomic Age mantra of nuclear war as unwinnable from the start, as Bernard Brodie suggested as early as 1946,8 and a clamoring chorus that “the ever-diminishing plausibility of the nuclear threat and ever bolder challenges to make good on it,” as Morgenthau wrote in 1964,9 itself voids the proposed value of deterrence.

James Giordano’s work is supported in part by federal funds from Award UL1TR001409 from the National Center for Advancing Translational Sciences (NCATS), National Institutes of Health, through the Clinical and Translational Science Awards Program (CTSA), a trademark of the Department of Health and Human Services, part of the Roadmap Initiative, “Re-Engineering the Clinical Research Enterprise”; National Sciences Foundation Award 2113811 – Amendment ID 001; the Henry Jackson Foundation for Military Medicine; the Strategic Multilayer Assessment Branch of the Joint Staff, and US Strategic Command, Pentagon; the Institute for Biodefense Research; the Simon Center for the Professional Military Ethic, United States Military Academy, West Point, NY, USA, and Leadership Initiatives

Link to Publication:

LinkClick.aspx (army.mil)

This publication was released as part of the SMA project “21st Century Strategic Deterrence Frameworks.” (SDF) For more information regarding this project, please click here.

Author: Dr. Sabrina Polansky (NSI, Inc.)

This publication was released as part of the SMA project “21st Century Strategic Deterrence Frameworks.” (SDF) For more information regarding this project, please click here.

Publication Preview:

This work was situated within the broader Strategic Multilayer Assessment Strategic Deterrence Frameworks (SDF) study, which incorporated four lines of effort (LOEs) and was initiated at the request of US Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM). The present LOE4 study was oriented around two guiding questions in a supplementary project request letter signed by US European Command (EUCOM) Deputy Commander, Lieutenant General Steven Basham: 1) How does USEUCOM deter with and through allies and partners as part of integrated deterrence? and 2) What is the optimal balance of US and ally commitment and capability to maintain an effective deterrent to aggression in Europe?

This study conceptualizes integrated deterrence as incorporating multiple elements, including coordination that occurs across domains, capabilities, or instruments of national power, among allies and partners, and across geographies—emphasizing the latter two elements. The study was contextualized to a three-peer deterrence problem, for which we explored three aspects: signaling, challenges and opportunities, and resources required for effective deterrence.

Twenty-two experts were interviewed for this study under the Chatham House Rule. Participants represented the perspectives of 13 countries and subject matter expertise on Russia, China, and hybrid threats. A participant summary can be found in the tables to the right. Country experts were drawn from four categories: 1) retired generals or admirals at think tanks or individual countries’ war colleges, 2) current military officers (US equivalent O-6 and above), 3) country subject matter experts, including non-government experts, and 4) National Liaison Officers. Interviews were conducted in two rounds to enable the team to gather initial insights, determine topics for further exploration, identify any gaps in knowledge or understanding, and allow for question refinement based on initial findings and USEUCOM feedback.

Desk research was conducted to provide a basis for study and question development, guide study interviews, and inform analysis. Analysis was conducted on over 250 pages of interview transcripts to develop an appropriate framework in which to organize and contextualize the experts’ rich and wide-ranging insights. While experts’ opinions varied, this variation typically reflected nuance along a conceptual spectrum rather than opposing schools of thought. There was a great deal of convergence across the experts’ inputs, not only within this study but also coherent with study findings from other LOEs in the broader SDF project. The current analysis yielded seven key themes, the content of which reflect the experts’ insights and recommendations and are elaborated below. For clarity of presentation, the experts’ ideas are stated in a straightforward, declarative way (i.e., most sentences will not begin with “the experts indicated…”); all assertions not otherwise cited thus represent the study experts’ statements and suggestions rather than the present author’s. Themes 1-3 broadly capture the necessary prerequisites for effective integrated deterrence, while themes 4-6 focus on execution, and the central focus of theme 7 is forward-looking. There are significant connections across themes.

This publication was released as part of the SMA project "21st Century Strategic Deterrence Frameworks." (SDF) For more information regarding this project, please click here.

Author: Dr. Tom Tyler (Yale University)

This publication was released as part of the SMA project “21st Century Strategic Deterrence Frameworks.” (SDF) For more information regarding this project, please click here.

Publication Preview:

This review focuses on research findings about the effectiveness of the perceived risk of sanctions on criminal behavior. The goal of this review is to help policymakers understand the basic conclusions to be drawn from the large empirical literature on whether and when the possibility of sanctions or incentives shapes the frequency with which people violate rules. The key conclusion is that deterrence can and frequently does shape people’s behavior, with perceived certainty of punishment being the most important factor shaping what people do. A variety of background factors shape the strength of this relationship. While deterrence does “work” researchers suggest that it is a costly mechanism to achieve minor gains in compliance; other approaches are as powerful or more powerful and have lower costs.

This publication was released as part of the SMA project “21st Century Strategic Deterrence Frameworks.” (SDF) For more information regarding this project, please click here.

‍