NSI Publications

Breaking the Fear Barrier and Creating a Culture of Courage

Breaking the Fear Barrier Video of NSI’s President Tom Rieger giving a barrier presentation to a large government organization. In his presentation, Tom discusses typical barriers due to fear from organizational issues such as low engagement, turnover, performance management system not working, etc. Most of the material in his presentation can be found in his book Breaking the Fear Barrier.

Greatest Threat is ISIS Loner

In the June 13, 2016 The Journal Gazette Dr. Kuznar discusses his view of the ISIS threat.

In the wake of the tragic mass shooting incident in Orlando, and the reported shooter’s pledge to ISIS immediately before the attack, it is a good time to take stock of how ISIS is manifest and how it represents a danger to our homeland. It is also useful to consider whom its members hate, for that identifies allies in this fight. I have spent over two years intensively studying ISIS messaging, both in my capacity as an anthropologist from IPFW and in consultation with the U.S. Department of Defense and I, unfortunately, have some insight into their motives and how they operate.

The upshot is that ISIS’s presence in social media is unprecedented and will persist long after its defeat. Therefore, the threat from radicalized individuals will unfortunately persist for a long time. However, we are not helpless. We can minimize the threat and defend the homeland through a combination of effective law enforcement, collaboration with Muslim communities, respectful and legal vigilance, and reaching out to friends and loved ones when we see indications of radicalization.

It is useful to consider three faces of ISIS: the ISIS central organization that occupies areas of Syria and Iraq, ISIS affiliates who have pledged allegiance to ISIS central, and ISIS online.

ISIS central apparently has yet to organize an attack on the U.S. homeland, and has so far only organized Western attacks in Paris and Brussels. Also, we are winning the war against ISIS central; U.S.-backed Kurdish and Arab militia are advancing toward ISIS’s capital of Raqqa in Syria, and the U.S. backed Iraqi government has advanced into Fallujah and is staging an ultimate advance on Mosul. ISIS central is beginning to crumble, as is its ability to attack us at home.

The ISIS affiliates that exist from Nigeria to India will suffer with the demise of ISIS central. Just in the past couple of days, the ISIS affiliate in Libya has lost major territory. Any capacity or motivation by ISIS central’s affiliates to attack our homeland will have been severely diminished.

ISIS online will persist for two reasons. First, ISIS central and its affiliates are organizations whose membership and leadership can be attacked and dismantled. But ISIS online is essentially leaderless; there is no thing to attack, other than a diffuse set of ideas, and ideas can be hard (but not impossible) to defeat. Second, once something exists online, it is there forever. As long as there are disaffected people who are looking for an outlet for their frustration and hate, the poisonous messages ISIS and other groups flood the internet with will be there for consumption.

Who does ISIS and their sympathizers hate? They essentially hate all humanity save for the tiny minority that represent their ultra-extreme views. I have studied ISIS’s prioritization of enemies, and their top enemies are Shia Muslims and all Sunni Muslims who do not conform to their extremely violent take on Islam. These ISIS enemies account for nearly a quarter of the world’s population. Next in line would be the West, and they consider the U.S. the leader of a Western movement to destroy Islam. ISIS has opened affiliates in India and China as well to oppose Hindus and Chinese secularism. Once you do the math (don’t forget Africa), it is easy to see that they hate everyone in the world who is not them.

The take-away for clearly understanding the nature of the ISIS threat to the homeland? First, as ISIS organizations are degraded and defeated, they may lash out with attacks, but these organizations will ultimately lose their ability to attack our homeland. A greater threat emanates from Americans who have joined ISIS returning as those organizations are defeated. The greatest threat to the homeland comes from lone wolf attackers who self-radicalize through online and social media sources, which unfortunately are likely to persist.

These sobering facts at least provide guidelines for how we can defend our homeland. The threat from organized groups abroad will ultimately go away. Any Americans who may return (which is likely to be few, recent analyses indicate that at least half of foreign fighters who join ISIS die with ISIS) must be located by law enforcement, which is possible since joining ISIS is a crime.

Lone wolf attackers will be very difficult, but not entirely impossible to guard against. There are things we can do. Don’t forget that the world is their enemy; that gives us a lot of allies. A Department of Justice funded study found that mosque attendance is an important factor that prevents radicalization. Muslim communities in the U.S. already have been proactive in working with law enforcement to prevent radicalization, which is a major reason why the U.S. has experienced much less jihadist terror than Europe.

Not all ISIS terrorists are Muslim initially; many are converts, “troubled souls” looking for an outlet for their hate. The Department of Homeland Security launched a “See Something, Say Something” campaign, in which citizens are encouraged to report suspicious activity to law enforcement officials. We can defend our homeland with simple vigilance that is respectful of everyone. This vigilance should extend to family members and friends who detect shifts toward radicalization in loved ones. In every case of a lone wolf attack, people close to the attackers witnessed troubling changes in behavior. We need to reach out to those we care about and keep them close to us, not to some movement of hate.

The events in Orlando are tragic and troubling, but the homeland is intact and we all can play productive roles to keep it that way.

Why Dignity is the Key to Customer Service

By Tom Rieger

Taking another look at what it means to treat customers with dignity and how it benefits your business.

For the last several decades customer service has cycled through an evolution of different metrics, all focused on measuring if the customer is happy. It started with satisfaction, then moved to loyalty, engagement, customer value, back to loyalty, then the recommend question, and even level of effort. Regardless of the label, the intent of these metrics is largely the same. Make the customer happy.

Putting the subtle differences between these metrics aside, focusing on just a “happy metric” of customer service ignores perhaps the most critical role of a service representative. Yes, reps are customer advocates, but they are much more than that. They often have to be the parent, the coach or the referee who says “no.” Customer service reps are not just customer advocates. They are defenders of your brand.

Understanding Dignity

What this all comes down to is not about if the customer was given what they wanted no matter what, but if they were treated with dignity in the process.

But what does dignity mean? What happens when it is present, or absent?

Over the past seven months, I have had the privilege of working with Sabrina Pagano, Ph.D., who has spent much of the last decade reviewing existing research on moral emotions, perceived justice and the elements of dignity, as well as researching the concept of dignity itself. In my conversations with Dr. Pagano, a few implications of the research came to light.

• When dignity is violated, people feel moral outrage. Often, this is accompanied by a desire to punish the perpetrator.
• If people feel they are treated in a just and fair manner, they are more willing to accept and comply with decisions and outcomes, even ones they may not find desirable.
• Dignity is very much wrapped up in strong emotions, ranging from elevation and self-worth on one end of the spectrum, to embarrassment, shame and even disgust on the low end.

Putting Dignity to Work

So what does all of this imply for customer service? First, if a company does not focus on and maintain the dignity of its customers, then their customers are likely to feel moral outrage and a desire to punish the brand. It is not hard to imagine a scenario where service becomes so impersonal that a brand is eventually destroyed.

Secondly, whether or not a representative says yes or no is not what is most important. What’s most important is how the customer is treated in the process. If the customer believes they were treated in a just and fair manner, and that their dignity was upheld, then it is likely that they will be more accepting of the outcome than if they believe they were treated unjustly.

Without this focus or realization, customer service reps that are being judged by the latest fad in “happy metrics” are put in a no-win situation every day. Give in to the customer to get the high rating, or do what they are supposed to do based on policy and get a low rating. If the focus shifts to dignity, then the most important thing becomes treating the customer well, while defending the integrity of the brand.

Dignity, however, is not a simple construct. There are emotional, situational and experiential aspects that all must be measured and coached for this paradigm shift to take hold. However, adopting such an approach is a way to finally recognize the total value of front-line employees, and avoiding over-emphasizing the “happy metrics.”

Holistic Engagement Activities Ranking Tool (HEART) — A Multi-criteria decision tool to assist in planning and tracking steady state security assistance and engagement activities.

Author | Editor: Astorino-Courtois, A. (NSI, Inc).

More than ever, United States Government (USG) activities are planned and implemented in an atmosphere of shrinking budgets, high expectations and intense scrutiny at home, plus non-conventional enemies and complex operating environments abroad. In the security realm, there is little debate that the demand for cost-effective, high-impact, and transparent use of government resources requires the Department of Defense (DOD), Department of State (DoS), and other government entities that operate oversees to work together or in complementary ways. Still, departments and their components have their own expanding missions, dwindling resources and programs to administer, making achieving unity of effort difficult. At present, there is no readily accessible process or framework that can incorporate and integrate the range of USG security-related activities abroad and that DOD planners and non-DOD practitioners might use to build common operating pictures – either within their own departments or in coordination with other departments working related activities. This deficiency increases the likelihood that what might be cost-saving efficiencies or wasteful redundancies in US security assistance and engagement programs will go unnoticed by planners and decision makers. Recognizing that US Africa Command (AFRICOM) engagement strategists and planners are in particular need of a systematic process for aligning resources and activities to strategies in the most effective and efficient ways possible, the Command J5 requested that the Strategic Multi-Layer Assessment (SMA) team, “develop an evaluative tool to aid in prioritization and metric development for command engagement strategies.”

Aligning resources to strategy has become an imperative for AFRICOM J5, and other command staffs. However, without a framework and standard measurement schema it is difficult, if not impossible to calculate the relative value of different engagement activities, as well as the trade-offs involved in changing priorities and activities. To address this need, NSI developed the Holistic Engagement Activities Ranking Tool (HEART), an evaluative tool, to provide planners with an accessible means of analyzing and optimizing AFRICOM engagement resources to national and Command objectives while retaining the flexibility to monitor and adjust to rapid changes in political-military environments and/or the priorities (e.g., cost, impact, contribution to mission success, risk to personnel) of greatest concern to the Command.

9th Annual SMA Conference: No War/No Peace…A New Paradigm in International Relations and a New Normal?

Author | Editor: Canna, S., Popp, G. & Yager, M. (NSI, Inc).

Background

Since the end of the Cold War and with the advent of the new century, new geopolitical realities have emerged that have made classical wars with national military forces pitted against each other far less likely. What we are witnessing are new categories of conflict that cannot be considered full1scale wars in the classical sense but cannot be described as “peace” either. Small1scale conflicts are complemented with intense engagement in the Information and other Spheres. These will almost certainly have great implications in the legal domains as well new forms of alliances. Multiple factors have come into play for these trends to emerge. This is a story of change versus continuity, and the conference focused on what has changed since the collapse of the USSR. As such, there are structural and intellectual challenges that prevent the United States Government (USG) from adapting and thriving is this new environment.

Such blurring of war and peace is directly related to the softening of previously considered “solid” categorical binary distinctions (state/non1state, criminal/noncriminal, licit/illicit, etc.). Much of our diplomatic, legal, and military affairs have been predicated on being to able draw clear distinctions between these categories, and many actors are realizing that blurring them provides “strategic ambiguity.” Many of the issues associated with the blurring of these categories are most obvious in the cyber realm. Many of our adversaries are much better than we are at dealing with and, indeed, exploiting these fluid situations.

There are several factors contributing to the issue of “blurring of war and peace.” These include changes to the

1. type of actors involved characterized by the blurring of state/non1state, licit/illicit, organized crime/militant actions, etc.;
2. intent of those actors (i.e., actors’ willingness to exploit ambiguity);
3. capabilities/means that make ambiguous action more viable (e.g., cyber, media operations, the use of proxies, etc.); and
4. changes to the strategic context of international political1security dynamics, which will foster and enable such approaches.

Some of these concepts have been around for many decades like Military Operations Other Than War, but there are some fundamental differences that require very different framing and structure, and we simply have not gotten our heads around it as a nation. Government control of information is fading, which has given rise to the global citizen phenomena and globalized what were once geographically bounded, nationalist movements. Even terrorism is globalizing. We read headlines, discuss, and face things today that just did not exist 40 years ago…but our structures to cope were built 70 years ago. We are structured for regime change, to fight nations, and now, by proxy, “groups,” but we have not got a clue how to defeat “movements” that do not possess the familiar nation1state center of gravity and, increasingly, that is what we will face. This all speaks to the limits of power as the sources, derivation, and locus of power is being completely reinvented. The question is do we need a new plan to orient ourselves to face these challenges?

The intent of the conference was to examine the root causes of these new types of conflicts and their implications and provide a contextual understanding. The emphasis was predominantly on the diagnosing of the underlying causes, about orientation, and getting to a meaningful articulation of the problem. In so doing, the conference emphasized and highlighted the need for a “whole1of1government” approach to facing and coming to grips with these challenges. These include military power, diplomacy, and criminal justice, etc. The Panels ranged from those with holistic understanding of these trends to others with a regional focus.

Strategic Multi1Layer Assessment (SMA) provides planning support to Commands with complex operational imperatives requiring multi1agency, multi1disciplinary solutions that are NOT within core Service/Agency competency. Solutions and participants are sought across USG and beyond. SMA is accepted and synchronized by Joint Staff and executed by ASD (EC P).

Executive Summary

This executive summary highlights key insights derived from speaker and participant interactions. This summary is meant to be comprehensive but does not force consensus. In fact, this summary should highlight that there is a high degree of ambiguity regarding what the gray zone is, what the USG should do about it, and what key questions remain.

The gray zone seems to be a return to an older, more expansive view of how an actor pursues its interests on the international scene. Yet, it only seems “gray” or “new” to us because we have defined a black and white lens through which to see the world. Others clearly do not feel they get value from adopting a similar black and white lens and act in ways that transgress our starker worldview.

Our tendency to think about the world in terms of black and white originates from our success in constructing a world system after World War II that conformed to our values and preferences, making us perfectly adapted to that initial state1base system of global order. As each technological advance concentrated power in fewer and fewer actors, the USG established its hegemony in the international system.% Then the USG created the cyber domain, and it had the opposite effect. It empowered individuals everywhere.

What is our goal in the gray zone?

Conference participants seemed to agree that the US goals with regard to the gray zone should push the USG “left of boom.” The goal is to identify and mitigate threats before they erupt into militarize conflict. Staying in phase zero is victory.

Conference participants spoke about the gray zone in a number of ways. Understanding how we talk about the gray zone will have implications for the conclusions you draw about it. The word cloud below highlights predominant words conference participants used to describe the gray zone during the conference.

Participants nearly all agreed that gray zone challenges take place primarily in the human domain. However, there were two schools of thought regarding the concentration of power. One school of thought felt that state power (as employed by Russia and China) are resurging in news sorts of ways in the gray zone. Both Russia and China have seen the rise of strong, autocratic leaders such as Putin and Xi. The other school of thought acknowledged that while some strongmen remain, in general, power is fragmenting as individuals are empowered. Proponents of the second school of thought argued that the problem with the concentration of power idea is that it correlates wealth concentration with power concentration, which is the exception not the norm in this environment.

Regardless, we seem to be seeing the breakdown of global institutional order, which has changed the distribution of power. This is complicated by the fact that our adversaries now have access to tools and weapons systems previously reserved for states, especially with regard to cyber, drones, and miniaturization. Furthermore, adversaries and competitors will not be constrained by artificial boundaries like the law, bureaucracy, authorities, etc. They operate seamlessly and make decisions quickly.

The gray zone has been alternating and described as an operating environment, a type of conflict, and a strategy. Some felt it exists outside (left of) of the conflict spectrum, some felt it primarily took place in phase zero, and some felt it occurs across the full range of conflict. If you look for opportunities within the gray zone, you realize that the area right of boom is the domain of threats and military conflict, the area left of boom is the domain of opportunity. This domain includes acceptable, if not preferable, competition that we take in order to protect our national interests. The USG clearly sees the gray zone as a threatening, but we should not discount opportunities as well.

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Barriers to Civil Order in Palestinian Security Sector

Author | Editor: Desjardins, A., Polansky (Pagano), S., Popp, R. & Rieger, T. (NSI, Inc).

The origins of the Palestinian security sector can be traced to the 1993 Oslo I Accord, which established divisive security and policing responsibilities between the Palestinians and Israelis and the Oslo II agreement, which codified interim boundaries, including the division of the West Bank into a complex and fragmented patchwork of different jurisdictions. These divisions of land and security responsibilities remain in place to this day and have fostered a unique, complicated, and at times perplexing situation for both the Palestinian security sector and the civil society it serves to protect. The environment in the West Bank is replete with confusion over security sector authorities and responsibilities, frustration over barriers1 to the provision of security and justice, and fear and mistrust of the security sector forces. Moreover, the absence of publically available mission statements and codified legal documents, that clearly delineate the Palestinian security sector roles and responsibilities, adds to the complex situation.

At the request of the United States Security Coordinator (USSC) staff, an analysis was conducted to identify security sector reform measures that would assist in fostering a healthy and transparent relationship between the Palestinian security sector and Palestinian civil society in the West Bank. To this end, we focused on assessing the performance of the Palestinian security sector in the provision of security to the Palestinian civil society via a two stage analytic methodology. First, we conducted a qualitative assessment comparing Palestinian security sector functions and activities that are authorized based on legal documents with those that are reported via news reports and by civil society, and, second, we compared this with acceptable practices in the provision of security consistent with modern security forces. To simplify and clearly convey our analysis, we utilized “living” Venn diagrams, which allows for the rapid integration of additional data and information as they become available. This was followed by a barrier analysis identifying internal and external barriers and their associated root causes in the provision of security that is not in alignment with Palestinian civil society perspectives and expectations. The identification and classification of barriers and their root causes facilitates the detection of points for security sector reform measures that can both strengthen and solidify the Palestinian security sector in a manner that is popularly accepted and sustainable with the Palestinian civil society.

Overall, our analysis identified five primary barrier categories in the provision of security by the Palestinian security sector—fear based barriers, clarity and alignment barriers, population engagement barriers, capability barriers, and legal barriers. Several external barriers, which are based on factors or influence outside of Palestinian control, were identified (e.g., culture of fear and limitations on movement or other activities). These factors are more difficult to overcome in the current environment in the West Bank and, in many cases, may be rooted in an intractable problem. However, several internal barriers, such as insufficient legal frameworks or lack of preparedness, that are within the control of the Palestinian security sector were identified. This suggests that mitigating actions can be taken by the Palestinian security sector in partnership with international partners, even given the currently limiting socio3political environment in the West Bank, to reduce or dampen their effect on the provision of security.

Thus, drawing from our analysis, several high3level security sector reform measures and mitigation strategies emerged. Our analysis suggests several focus areas for security sector reforms and development. Each is critical to the provision of security in the Palestinian Authority, is consistent with acceptable practices of modern security forces, and should facilitate civil society involvement.

Clarify confusion over roles and responsibilities—support the creation of clear, comprehensive, and codified legal documents laying out the missions and duties of each Palestinian security sector entity; this helps ensure accountability of and trust in the Palestinian security sector and its ability to ensure the safety of its citizens.

• Guide Palestinian security sector toward completion of comprehensive legal documents that delineate Palestinian security sector forces mission and duties in clear language;
• Ensure that guidelines establish the lines of authority and purview within and across the forces;
• Emphasize common Palestinian identity and goals as part of a superordinate ingroup, but avoid the pitfall of reinforcing Israel as the outgroup;
• Work to establish a more cohesive security philosophy that can guide all of the Palestinian security sector forces in pursuit of a common goal.

Strengthen legitimacy—take measures to re3establish the trust of Palestinian civil society in its security sector forces in order to promote cooperation and adherence, as well as smooth the path for the Palestinian security sector to perform its duties once they are more clearly and explicitly defined and established.

• Guide Palestinian security sector toward establishing formal complaint and feedback systems, which will not result in retribution;
• Establish protocols and training that facilitate respectful and fair treatment of members of Palestinian civil society and avoid human rights abuses;
• Emphasize the proper selection of candidates for jobs at the individual and aggregate level
• Work to reduce cronyism and other forms of bias in employment selection;
• Encourage organizations to take responsibility for missteps and apologize to the population as needed when mistakes are made;
• Work to establish an effective witness protection program;
• Work to more generally increase transparency and accountability;
• Work to establish independent oversight, for example, through the appointment of an ombudsman to investigate citizens’ complaints.

Improve equipping and training of forces—critical for Palestinian security sector to effectively execute its duties is having sufficient equipment and training, although this issue may be less easily resolved due to dependence of the Palestinian Authority for Israeli approval of materiel.

• Prioritize the establishment and funding of an improved communications infrastructure for security;
• Work to centralize training facilities;
• Streamline training curricula to emphasize common principles and needs across security organizations, while maintaining differentiation as needed;
• Perform an audit of existing training;
• Assess remaining training needs based on pain points after the higher priority goals have been met and/or barriers have been mitigated;
• Ensure that training maps to the overarching security philosophy that should be established in advance.

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Drivers of Conflict and Convergence in the Asia-Pacific Region in the Next 5-25 Years.

Author | Editor: Bragg, B. (NSI, Inc).

USPACOM requested that the Strategic Multi-layer Assessment (SMA) team conduct an “Examination of future political, security, societal, and economic trends to identify where US interests are in cooperation or conflict with Chinese and other interests particularly in the East China Sea.” More specifically, USPACOM requested an examination of future political, security, societal, and economic trends; identification of where US strategic interests are in cooperation or conflict with Chinese and other interests, particularly in the East China Sea; and suggestions as to how USPACOM might best leverage opportunities when dealing with China in a “global context.” The project request also included a series of questions (see Appendix A) that, taken together represent two broad concerns.

• The Nature of the Future Operating Environment. Namely, how should USPACOM planners envisage the threats and opportunities represented by the Asian environment over the next 5, 10 to 25 years? (Questions 1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 8)
• US Engagement Policy. Specifically, what are the key components of a regional engagement policy centered on China that empowers US partners and allied interests to foster multi-lateral defense of strategic stability in USPACOM’s AOR? (Questions 9, 5, 6, 10 and 11)

The primary objective of this project was to provide decision makers the tools to make better sense of the non-linear dynamics and feedback mechanisms at play in the complex environment in which they, and their competitors, operate in the Pacific region and, by doing so, broaden the horizon of strategic thinking and inform planning.

SMA convened a multidisciplinary group of eleven teams drawn from government, industry, think tanks, and universities. The individual teams employed multiple methodological approaches, including strategic analytic simulation and qualitative, quantitative, and mixed analyses to address USPACOM’s questions. This integration report focuses on the qualitative and quantitative analyses conducted by the think-tank and industry teams (CEIP, CSIS, Monitor 360) and academic teams (START, TAMU, UBC) that informed the simulation and modeling work done by the other teams (GMU, NPS, ICONS).

Executive Summary

Evaluating strategic risk in the Asia-Pacific region over the next two to three decades is a complex challenge that is vital for USPACOM planning and mission success. Based on current trends, it appears that what some have dubbed the ‘Asian Century’ may be taking shape. By 2020, three of the five largest economies in the world and more than half of the ten largest militaries in the world will be located in Asia, and more than half of the world’s population will soon reside in the region. How well the United States (US) responds to emerging opportunities and threats to its interests will be determined by the depth of its understanding of the diverse set of political, economic, and social factors in the region. A better understanding of the priorities and interests that drive the “rise” of China, Asia’s largest country, as well as the likely global consequences of its actions will help planners and policy makers both anticipate and respond to future developments. A multi-disciplinary framework that combines these needs could provide valuable insight in dealing with this complex and evolving issue.

The diverse range of approaches and sources utilized by the individual teams involved in this project is one of the strengths of the SMA approach; however, it also makes comparison and synthesis across individual analyses more challenging. The findings from this project are integrated using an interest- based framework. Most broadly, these interests can be categorized as security (preservation of the state and military security), economic (economic prosperity and development), and prestige (international influence and standing). National interests generate economic, social, and international prestige objectives for states, which in turn inform their foreign policy goals and underpin a state’s position and response to specific issues that arise in regional relations. Domestic constraints and pressures can intervene between national interests and foreign policy objectives, potentially changing the nature of that objective, its relative salience, or both.

Without an understanding of the national interests and objectives of both sides, anticipating the likely consequences of any action to influence an issue becomes a matter of luck. The potential of a situation or action to create conflict or cooperation between states is a function of how those states’ interests align and whether their leadership perceives these interests to align or conflict. When interests lead states to seek or prefer different outcomes, conflict (not necessarily military) is created and all states involved face some risk that their interests will be threatened, although if they prevail, there is also opportunity to further or secure an interest. When the interests of states align and all involved can benefit from the same outcome, opportunity also exists. Consciously or not, state leaders and decision makers attribute objectives, goals, interests, and intentions to other states, and interpret their actions in light of these attributions.

Contributing Authors

Swaine, M. ( Nicholas Eberstadt, M. Taylor Fravel, Mikkal Herberg, Albert Keidel, Evans J. R. Revere, Alan D. Romberg, Eleanor Freund, Rachel Esplin Odell, Audrye Wong, CEIP. Dr. Belinda Bragg, NSI. Dr. John Stevenson, UMd. Lt Gen (Ret) Dr. Robert Elder, Dr. Alex Levis,
GMU. Dr. Rita Parhad, Mr. Jordan D’Amato, Mr. Seth Sullivan, Monitor-360. Dr. Peter Suedfeld, Brad Morrison, UBC. Dr. Randy Kluver, Dr. Jacquelyn Chinn, Dr. Will Norris, TAMU. Dr. Clifford A. Whitcomb, Dr. Tarek Abdel-Hamid, Dr. CAPT Wayne Porter, USN (Ret), Mr. Paul T. Beery; Mr. Christopher Wolfgeher; Mr. Gary W. Parker, CDR Michael Szczerbinski, USN; Major Chike Robertson, USA (Naval Postgraduate School)

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In pregNSI participated in a large effort focused on identifying areas of strategic risk and opportunity in the Asia-Pacific region over the next two decades. A rising China resides within a very dynamic Asia-Pacific region. A long list of Chinese influence and investment activities abroad together with an active military enhancement program indicate that China is positioning itself to pursue national security interests well beyond the Pacific Rim. As Chinese interests and policy objectives broaden to farther reaches of the globe there is greater likelihood that they will run up against key US international interests. The intersection of US and Chinese interests could represent either a source of conflict or opportunity for cooperation. The main question that US policy makers and planners must consider carefully is: Where and which Chinese interests are most likely to conflict with US global interests, and where may there be opportunities for cooperation? The current problem this project addressed is uncertainty about the likely trajectory of increasingly global Chinese national interests abroad and how these relate to key US interests. The primary objective was to provide decision-makers the tools to make better sense of the non-linear dynamics and feedback mechanisms at play in the complex environment in which they, and their competitors, operate in the Asia-Pacific region, and broaden the horizon of strategic thinking and inform planning.

NSI utilized techniques from our human behavior analytics to examine future political, security, societal, and economic trends; identify where US strategic interests are in cooperation or conflict with Chinese and other interests worldwide, and in particular, to the East China Sea; and assess drivers of divergence, conflict, and convergence when dealing with China in a global context. NSI developed the US-PRC Global Engagement Framework based on the inputs and variety of analytic results produced by other team members to facilitate consistent and coherent integration. Some “key parameters” of the US-PRC Global Engagement Framework included US-China economic trade barriers, imbalances, opportunities, environmental concerns, food security, agricultural policies, water management, carbon-based fuel alternatives, scarcity of resources (competition and cooperation), freedom / denial of access and intrusion issues, military challenges and opportunities, technology and academic exchanges, human rights, national demographics and their impacts on economies, human migration, and third world development. NSI also helped bridge strategic level analysis and operational level needs to ensure the concepts, analyses and results were actionable for end-users such as military planners, strategists and/or decision-makers.

The following is the list of reports completed in support of this effort. Reports and events can be accessed via the links provided

*Reports without a link can be requested by emailing mariah.c.yager.ctr@mail.mil from a .mil or .gov email address.

Reports

In progress

The Dynamics of Israeli and Palestinian Security Requirements in the West Bank—Cross-border activities, sovereignty and governing legitimacy.

Author | Editor: Astorino-Coutois, A., Bragg, B. & Key, K. (NSI, Inc).

This report presents insights from an analysis of a conceptual map, or qualitative loop diagram that relates Israeli and PA sovereignty and legitimacy in the West Bank territories with Palestinian violence and cross-border attacks against Israeli citizens, as well as IDF/COGAT activities. The relationships and feedback loops of Israeli and Palestinian security and political positions reflect those dynamics that drive the security challenges and risks that impact the effectiveness of PA security sector reform and institutional development. Specifically, the loop analyses suggest that:

PASF capability enhancements can reduce PA legitimacy and limit the effectiveness of security sector reform. PASF capability enhancements seen to also improve security for Israelis can degrade popular support for the PASF, increase social frustration and worsen the security situation in the West Bank. They can also reduce PA legitimacy and reduce the effectiveness of successful security sector reform and institutional capacity building.

Implications for USSC/USG

PASF training/routine emphasizes protection of Palestinians. PASF capability enhancements and training geared toward providing publically observable protection for Palestinians especially in areas associated with Palestinian livelihoods (e.g., orchards) and other areas traversed by Israeli settlers;

Emphasize PASF protection role. Together with visible reemphasis of PASF activities, public affairs communications including outreach to civil society to reinforce message that purpose of PASF is to protect Palestinians can enhance public regard and PA legitimacy;

Emphasize service provision and inclusiveness to enhance PA legitimacy. Other activities to strengthen PA governing legitimacy (e.g., inclusion of alternative views, dependable provision of services) are essential for PA legitimacy and ultimate success of security sector institution building.

Israeli security activities have self-reinforcing adverse effects on PA legitimacy and development of security sector institutions. IDF activity in Areas A and B impact perceived PA governing legitimacy in two ways. Most immediately, IDF security actions, targeted killings, arrests and imprisonment represent an affront to Palestinian national sensitivities and thereby increase the level of social tension in the West Bank. Together with demonstrating the failure of the PA to provide the most basic public service, i.e., security for its citizens, they can diminish popular perceptions of PA legitimacy. Because effective implementation of security sector reforms and institution building require Palestinians to see the PA as legitimate and the PASF as credible, IDF activities also indirectly degrade efforts to build PASF capacity and ultimately to provide security services for Palestinians which feeds into one of the central challenges to the stability of the Fatah-led PA government: the popular appeal and credibility of its phased, institution-building approach versus the approach of Hamas and other actors that highlights rejection and resistance. Completing the feedback loop, impeding the PASF capacity to provide effective security to Palestinians and Israelis in Areas A and B does nothing to reduce Israeli security concerns and reinforces the same, or rising, level of IDF activity in those areas.

Implications for USSC/USG

Advocating for return to more restrictive IDF ROE in the WB including restrictions on live fire, roadblocks and training exercises along with visible reduction in IDF presence in Areas A & B can reduce Palestinian social tension and, if representing observable change can help stabilize day- to-day security situation.

Uncertainty about the final status of the West Bank makes re-opening peace talks more difficult. Uncertainty about the permanence of the current setting in the WB generates two means of decreased WB security. On the one hand it is a direct source of the type of Palestinian social frustration that can lead to violence. On the other, it is a driver of the Israeli government’s accelerated settlement and military establishment construction and consequent illegal seizure and/or destruction of Palestinian land by the Israeli government. This in turn poses an affront to Palestinian notions of national identity, rights and sovereign control, also feeding social frustration and diminishing the popularly perceived governing legitimacy of the PA. Perceived failures of the PA also strengthen the appeal of resistance-based approaches as the only means for dealing with Israel. Given that PA governing legitimacy is so indelibly tied to the phased, institution-building approach established by the Oslo process and the promise of eventual Palestinian statehood (i.e., sovereignty) it significantly weakens any claim to PA governing legitimacy. Unfortunately, it is the PA with which Israel and the US are committed to negotiate a final status agreement and the loss of popular support for the PA coupled with insecure conditions in the Palestinian territories have been used by Israeli leaders as reasons for pulling out of or even engaging in peace talks.

Implications for USSC/USG

US policy supporting “independent, viable and contiguous Palestinian state” has led Israeli governments to create ‘facts on the ground’ and literal barriers to negotiated settlement via land confiscation and military and settlement construction. To Palestinians, US statements, together with settlement construction, can ring hollow or at best are confusing given the intimation of sovereignty associated with “statehood.”

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SMA Megacities: Deep Dive Application of two socio-cultural frameworks to a flood event in Dhaka, Bangladesh.

Author | Editor: Bragg, B,, Brickman, D., Canna, S. & Desjardins, A. (NSI, Inc).

The Strategic-Multilayer Assessment (SMA) Megacity Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Intelligence (M- RSI) project seeks to aid United States Pacific Command (USPACOM) in understanding socio-cultural dynamics within megacities. For this portion of the project, USPACOM socio-cultural analysis (SCA) planning frameworks (“the SCA approach”) were used to guide remote data collection for a proto-type assessment of the risk of humanitarian crisis in Dhaka, Bangladesh. The SCA approach consists of five distinct, yet related frameworks1 that are designed to provide planners with a quick triage tool to assess risk, as well as provide a guide for analysts conducting longer-term assessments. The five frameworks are structured to reflect USPACOM’s mission objectives and planning process. Given this was a proof of concept effort, analysts were asked to apply two of the five SCA frameworks—the SCA Humanitarian Crisis (HC) Framework and the Intra-state Violence (IV) Framework—to Dhaka, Bangladesh.

In addition to identifying the key risk factors for humanitarian crisis in Dhaka, this study considered the following question regarding the connection between a humanitarian crisis and the risk of intrastate violence/VEO activity in Dhaka:

1. Could government/NGO failures to provide immediate relief and rescue in the event of a humanitarian crisis in Dhaka enhance support for VEO-affiliated groups in the city?

The effort represents an initial attempt to expand the use of the SCA frameworks by linking risks in one framework to risks in another as well as determining relationships between, and joint impacts of, framework elements.

During non-crisis (Phase 0) periods, the SCA Humanitarian Crisis framework described below can be used to help analysts and planners track the general nature of the risk of humanitarian crisis. As shown in Figure 1, humanitarian crises can be triggered by one of a number of factors—some environmental (floods) and some socio-political (conflict). All create a unique set of risks for those affected and those seeking to respond. The level and type of risk of humanitarian crisis is determined by the level of services (law enforcement, health and medical, and utilities) the government provides, the readiness and response capabilities, and the recovery capacity of the affected area.

Utilizing data and information remotely collected—to include quantitative and qualitative data, academic research, news reports, and international and NGO policy documents and reports—analysts were able to conduct a quick triage risk assessment of the area of interest, in this case of Dhaka, Bangladesh. For example, they were able to determine how the quality of roads in Dhaka (route trafficability) affected the risk of humanitarian crisis in the event of a natural hazard such as a flood. Analysts employed a simple five-point qualitative coding scheme ranging from no appreciable risk to severe risk to quickly measure risk factors. Roll-up to higher levels was accomplished by applying a simple ordinal measure to these assessments. The “no appreciable risk” elements were scored as 1 (color coded green); low risk of failure as 2 (color coded yellow); moderate risk as 3 (color coded orange); severe risk as 4 (color coded red); and elements that had insufficient information to evaluate were scored as 0 (color coded grey).

Analysts began with a triage assessment of the overall humanitarian crisis factors before delving into analysis of risk in the context of severe flooding. The HC Framework contains factors relating to three stages of disaster relief: immediate impact, disaster response and responsibilities, and recovery and reconstruction. It was important to separate these phases/functions as the information on even the same elements (e.g., actors, procedures, and risk conditions) differs for each. Conducting a deep dive on a single factor allowed analysts to tailor the information related to each element in the risk framework to a specific condition and thus produce more tactical and operational analyses. For example, how flooding may impact the risk of humanitarian crisis due to the flood effects on potable water or delivery of medical supplies to areas in need. Upon completing analysis of the risk of flood-driven humanitarian crisis in Dhaka, analysts conducted a preliminary assessment of how such conditions may increase the risk of intrastate violence emerging as the result of such a flood.

Chapter Two provides an overview of Dhaka as well as a quick holistic assessment guided by the SCA HC Framework of individual factors relevant to assessing the risks of humanitarian crisis. Chapters Three through Five contain detailed assessment of a subset of framework risk factors of importance in the context of a flood in terms of immediate impact, institutional plans and responsibilities, and recovery. Chapter Six discusses how these risk factors relate to, and impact, the IV Framework as applied to Dhaka. Chapter Seven discusses implications for USPACOM and Chapter Eight provides a short discussion on the importance and unique challenges associated with megacities.

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