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SMA Publications (Tagged: Deterrence)

SMA Publication

The Shape of the Future Operating Environment: How Our Adversaries Have Learned to Stop Worrying and Ignore the Bomb

The report is organized around these three overarching concepts – state interest, perceived threats and opportunities, and international activities. The introduction details a theoretical background for each, and explains how, together, they offer a general framework for understanding the choices and behaviors of states in the international system. The concepts implicit in these two questions are complex and interdependent – requiring bounding choices. To stay within the scope of this project while providing a comprehensive mapping of the problem space, we have chosen to provide a high-level overview and comparison of all four states. For readers seeking a deeper dive into specific aspects of these questions for individual states, the reference section at the end of the report includes links to other SMA work with this level of detail. In this report we focus on how understanding these concepts provides a framework for expanding our understanding of deterrence strategy to account for the multi-domain as well as multi-actor nature of contemporary deterrence.
Year Published:
2021
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SMA Publication

Deterrence Among Three to Twelve Nuclear Powers: Fundamental Instability and Mitigation Strategy

The fundamental instability of bilateral nuclear deterrence (Albert Wohlstetter’s “delicate balance of terror”) is mitigated, in part, by each adversary deploying and maintaining weapons systems that are capable of guaranteeing a second-strike after an adversary has launched a first-strike. Additionally, bilateral arms control measures (norms, treaties, protocols, institutions) provide additional stability. The problem with multicountry nuclear deterrence is that there are no levels of armaments that can support stable deterrence relations among three or more adversaries; except in cases when adversaries coalesce into two alliances, in which case the system reduces to bilateral nuclear deterrence. This paper approaches this problem through formal methods and conceptualizes a solution involving an ensemble of military and politico-diplomatic strategies which, when operating as an enhanced international security regime, can mitigate the fundamental instability of the current multicountry nuclear deterrence system.
Year Published:
2024
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SMA Publication

11th Annual SMA Conference – “A Utopian or Dystopian Future, or Merely Muddling Through?”

This Conference assessed what today we rightly or wrongly perceive as historically unprecedented changes from the perspectives of politics and history, sociology, biology, information science, and technological innovation. There is a large body of scientific work that supports the notion that human societies are complex adaptive systems with emergent properties that contain core commonalities, but the actions of which cannot be predicted with certainty. Given the properties of human cognition and social behavior, the question remains: How might nations and societies best position themselves to prepare for and manage the risks associated with rapid change under conditions of fundamental uncertainty? The conference speakers and panelists addressed these issues relevant to key domains and dimensions of global security.
Year Published:
2018
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SMA Publication

Space Deterrence: Vulnerability-Credibility Tradeoff in Space Domain

We define space deterrence as preventing intentional attacks against space capabilities, regardless of their physical location. Intentional attacks may target space capabilities to deprive space-dependent nations of the ability to leverage space capabilities to either (1) provide indirect assistance to war fighting capabilities located in other domains, or (2) directly base weapons in space. We specify two types of deterrence (Type 1 and Type 2) corresponding to the two aforementioned ways in which space-faring nations leverage space capabilities. Type 1 deterrence concerns the defense of space assets which indirectly assist warfighting capabilities. Type 2 deterrence, on the other hand, concerns the prevention of the basing of weapons in space. Type 1 deterrence exhibits a distinctive vulnerability-credibility tradeoff due to peculiar characteristics of the space domain and how the United States leverages space to enhance other elements of national power. We conclude that unlike what classic deterrence models would predict, in space deterrence remaining reliant or dependent upon vulnerable space capabilities makes commitment to Type 1 deterrence more credible and thereby stable, lessening incentives for (kinetic or other forms of) aggression in crisis and conflict.
Year Published:
2018
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SMA Publication

How Should Space Feature in US Deterrence Strategy

This report summarizes key points from 27 insightful responses contributed by space experts from industry, the US government, academia, think tanks, and space law and policy communities. These also include expert contributions from non-US voices from Australia, France, and Italy. While this summary response presents an overview of the key subject matter expert insights, the points summarized below cannot fully convey the fine detail of the expert input provided, each of which is well worth reading in its entirety.
Year Published:
2017
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SMA Publication

Neurocognitive Science of Aggression, Decision Making

here are numerous national security challenges relative and relevant to the aggressive and/or violent intent and behavior of individuals, groups, and societies. In an ever more networked world, the ways that people think, emote, and behave are being increasingly affected by social, and informational factors; many made possible or fortified by the iterative use of various forms of technology. Despite demonstrably positive outcomes of such trends, there are also clear and present burdens, risks, threats and harms in the geo-political sphere that current and near-future social and technical developments can, and likely will incur.
Year Published:
2017
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SMA Publication

Strategic Multi-layer Assessment Report Card

Strategic Multi-Layer Assessment (SMA) provides planning support to Commands. SMA projects focus on complex operational imperatives requiring multi-agency, multi- disciplinary solutions that are NOT within core Service/Agency competency. SMA solutions and participants are sought across USG and beyond. SMA is accepted and synchronized by Joint Staff (JS/J-39) and executed by ASD(R&E)/EC&P/RRTO. SMA efforts are Coalition based and address mission areas spanning Counter-Terrorism; Counter-Insurgency; Countering Proliferation of WMD (State and non-State); Individual, State, and National-level Deterrence Assessment; and Strategic Global and Regional Assessments.
Year Published:
2017
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SMA Publication

Comprehensive Deterrence White Paper

The emerging concept of Comprehensive Deterrence is an initial effort to broaden strategic options for our National leaders to meet current and emerging security challenges. Comprehensive Deterrence internalizes the challenge from then Secretary of Defense Hagel’s Defense Innovation Memorandum (15 November 2014) to pursue innovative ways to sustain and advance U.S military superiority for the 21st Century. Comprehensive Deterrence also acknowledges the guidance from General Martin Dempsey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on 11 January 2015 when he noted that, “We’re going to have to think our way through the future, not bludgeon our way through it.”
Year Published:
2015
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SMA Publication

NeuroS&T Influence and Deterrence Effects

This white volume focuses on possible ways that insights from the neurosciences may be incorporated into, and used within the United States Government’s (USG) approaches and ability to conduct optimized influence and deterrence operations for the purpose of maintaining global stability. In this context, neuroscientific techniques, technologies and information are viewed as viable means to build upon and enhance tactical approaches from other disciplines such as the social sciences. Understanding the neurobiology of human behavior can provide an added dimension to formulating deterrence and influence strategies in the context of a security environment that has become more complex and far more fluid over last few decades. In this white paper, the term “neurodeterrence” refers to the consideration and application of evolutionary neurobiological information about, and understanding of cognition and social behaviors that are important to deterrence theory in contexts of conflict.
Year Published:
2014
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SMA Publication

Neurobiology of Aggression: Implications to Deterrence

This paper provides a series of selected topics on the neurobiological basis of aggression, in the interest of introducing this field of science to the community of experts in deterrence. Thus the topics covered are those of most relevance to inform a deterrence community of how neurobiological considerations may be incorporated as potentially useful tools in deterrence practice. The material is presented in 3 Parts: A summary of the basic neurobiology, a few chapters on behavioral impacts of that neurobiology, and finally a “systems summary” that integrates these issues for readers. Topics include the role of genes and environment, group vs. individual aggressive behaviors, the role of trust and altruism, reward/punishment, and premeditated vs. impulsive aggression, among others. The paper also discusses the continuum of scientific evidence base, from the basic neurobiology of reactive aggression, to pre- meditated aggression and what connections can be understood and conjoined to the psychological and behavioral evidence base.
Year Published:
2013
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SMA Publication

Analytic Techniques for Nuclear Strategy Analysis

The Concepts & Analysis of Nuclear Strategy (CANS) project undertaken for US Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) was tasked to examine the utility of alternative analytic techniques for assessing nuclear force attributes and sufficiency under a variety of changed conditions. The CANS software developed during this effort is designed to enhance the planning process by guiding the analyst through the process of selecting appropriate alternate analytic techniques.
Year Published:
2011
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SMA Publication

Attribute Tradeoff Model (ATOM) for Force Posturing

Given New Start, the Administration’s interest in “nuclear zero” and a budget-constrained environment, analysts are likely to receive greater numbers of requests for comparison of the capacity of various force postures and structures to achieve nuclear policy goals. At present, no theoretically grounded and systematic method exists for comparing how well specific (attribute- based) force postures support specific policy objectives. In the nuclear context, the central policy objectives identified by the Concepts and Analysis of Nuclear Strategy CANS project are strategic stability, counter proliferation, deterrence, assurance and defeat.
Year Published:
2011
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SMA Publication

Deterrence in the 21st Century: Volume I

This report summarizes the results from a 120-day effort that was undertaken to meet these challenges. A scope of the effort is provided by Lt Col Shannahan in section 1; namely, decision makers, policy makers and commanders at all levels need to better understand deterrence theory applicable to the 21st century security environment. The USG requires a typology to understand the ways and means to deter a non-nation-state actor while simultaneously retaining the means to deter and compel nation-states.
Year Published:
2007
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SMA Publication

Deterrence in the 21st Century: Volume II

This Deterrence Typology was created to assist in the development of deterrence options and plans for State and Non-State Actors. It can be used as a stand alone document for identifying important information to characterize and understand State or Non-State Actors. It can also assist in the development of initial questions that should be answered about either type of actor to be deterred.
Year Published:
2007
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SMA Publication

Deterrence in the 21st Century: Volume III

Supporting material for Volume II -- Deterrence Typology, which was created to assist in the development of deterrence options and plans for State and Non-State Actors.
Year Published:
2007
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SMA Publication

Avoiding Self-Deterrence in the Context of Nuclear Ambiguity

The context of this Report has to do with Russia’s use of nuclear ambiguity and implied nuclear threats leading up to and after its invasion of Ukraine—specifically, threats to escalate to the use of low-yield nuclear weapons to support conventional offensive operations for political or economic gains. It examines the implications of Russia’s behavior beyond the Ukraine conflict, in particular, what lessons might other actors have taken away from the Ukraine war regarding the utility of threatening the use of low-yield nuclear weapons. We have intentionally cast a wide net to include a diverse set of perspectives on a range of actors. More specific questions of interest for this volume include, among others:
Year Published:
2025
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SMA Publication

Who Will We—and They—be on Day 30 or Day 1000 in Deterrence?

The Joint Concept for Competing (JCC; Feb 2023) states that a ‘competitive mindset also means embracing strategic competition as a persistent and enduring national security challenge.’ That requires anticipating future change as adversaries respond to us, and we to them. Iteration. Yet although potential futures rapidly become impossibly numerous to analyse, and are in many ways unprestatable, we can identify regularities significant for deterrence planning.
Year Published:
2025
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SMA Publication

Russian Leadership Values and Regional Goals in the Arctic

This publication was released as part of the SMA project “21st Century Strategic Deterrence Frameworks.” Table 1 outlines seven areas in which the Russian leadership holds key values in the Arctic and High North. It offers a rough range of things/interests that the West could threaten in order to deter Russian aggression. The most important are outlined below in the text below.
Year Published:
2025
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SMA Publication

Emerging Chem-Bio (and Neuro-cognitive) and Data/Computational Science Capabilities and Threats

The twentieth century evidenced the increasing use of state-of-the-art science and technology (S&T) in warfare. Included in this S&T armamentarium were new chemical and biological agents that could be yoked to extant forms of S&T (e.g., aircraft, ordnance, etc.) to facilitate delivery in kinetic engagements. Such changes in the instruments of warfare served as impetus for formulating international signatory treaties and conventions (e.g., The Chemical Weapons Convention [CWC] and Biological Toxins and
Year Published:
2024
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SMA Publication

United States Deterrence Policy: 1944-Present

This literature review analyzes the evolution of US deterrence theory and policy from 1945 to the present day. It is organized into five “waves” representing different eras:
Year Published:
2025
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SMA Publication

Evolution of Deterrent Thinking in USSR and Russia: A Look through Military Reports

This comprehensive qualitative analysis examines the evolution of Russian articulations of deterrence by analyzing over 250 Russian military documents spanning from the Soviet era to the present. The research identifies seven periods that reflect paradigmatic shifts in the intellectual discourse of Russian military strategists regarding deterrence. These periods are not rigidly defined but serve as markers for transformations in military thinking. The analysis is supported by insights from relevant academic literature.
Year Published:
2025
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SMA Publication

Escalation Management in the Early Stages of International Crisis

This report evaluates how crisis actors respond to adversary actions in the early stages of an international crisis. We specifically consider the first three stages of a crisis: the trigger act from a challenger, the response act from the defender state which has been triggered, and then the counter-response
Year Published:
2024
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SMA Publication

Perceptual Deterrence

This review focuses on research findings about the effectiveness of the perceived risk of sanctions on criminal behavior. The goal of this review is to help policymakers understand the basic conclusions to be drawn from the large empirical literature on whether and when the possibility of sanctions or incentives shapes the frequency with which people violate rules. The key conclusion is that deterrence can and frequently does shape people’s behavior, with perceived certainty of punishment being the most important factor shaping what people do. A variety of background factors shape the strength of this relationship.
Year Published:
2024
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SMA Publication

International Collaboration in U.S. Integrated Deterrence: A Partner Perspective

This non-paper, prepared at the Swedish Defence University (SEDU), investigates the dynamics of deterrence in cooperation with the U.S.1 It is crafted for the SMA audience, providing preliminary insights into collaborative efforts within ID and emphasizing the value of partner contributions.
Year Published:
2024
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SMA Publication

Key Factors in Crisis Escalation

Over the past decade, the nature of international conflict has increasingly turned away from state-versus-state warfare becoming, instead, typified as relatively low-level crises. Different authors and institutionshave characterized this as gray zone warfare, hybrid warfare, or competition-short-of-war. The tools (i.e.,courses of action) used in this deliberately ambiguous space between war and peace have ranged from trade restrictions to information operations to the use of proxies in attempts to overthrow a government or aggressive maneuvers of military assets at or around contested geographic areas.
Year Published:
2024
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SMA Publication

CONCESSIONS TO THE LIMITED POWERS: Considerations of Low-Yield Nuclear Weapons, Asymmetrical Capability, and Extended Deterrence

Quite recently, nuclear strategy scholars Kier Lieber and Daryl Press posited that arms’ tables have turned, citing the asymmetry of limited nuclear powers as a reboot of the United States (US)-North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) tactical nuclear playbook during the Cold War. Their key message—that “The United States must take seriously the nuclear capabilities and resolve of its foes”—isn’t lost on us: we previously called for the need to begin serious counter-weapons of mass destruction (WMD) planning for adversarial use of nuclear weapons below the threshold of Armageddon.
Year Published:
2024
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SMA Publication

Integrated Deterrence Reachback Study

This work was situated within the broader Strategic Multilayer Assessment Strategic Deterrence Frameworks (SDF) study, which incorporated four lines of effort (LOEs) and was initiated at the request of US Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM).
Year Published:
2024
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SMA Publication

Measuring Policy Effectiveness of Cyber Deterrence and Defensibility

This work was situated within the broader Strategic Multilayer Assessment Strategic Deterrence Frameworks (SDF) study, which incorporated four lines of effort (LOEs) and was initiated at the request of US Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM). The present LOE4 study was oriented around two guiding questions in a supplementary project request letter signed by US European Command (EUCOM) Deputy Commander, Lieutenant General Steven Basham: 1) How does USEUCOM deter with and through allies and partners as part of integrated deterrence? and 2) What is the optimal balance of US and ally commitment and capability to maintain an effective deterrent to aggression in Europe?
Year Published:
2024
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SMA Publication

Moloch, the Meta-Crisis, and Integrated Nuclear Deterrence

This project examines global perspectives on evolving nuclear challenges and deterrence approaches by analyzing discourse across media, arms control experts, and social platforms in major nuclear-armed nations. Using computational analysis and qualitative coding, it compiles insights from news articles, arms control blogs, and Twitter commentary over the past decade. The goal is to gain an expansive view of public conversations regarding nuclear weapons issues to inform strategic planning and assessment of the strategic environment. By compiling diverse qualitative data points, the project aims to identify areas of alignment and mismatch between official deterrence policies and public discourse that could illuminate whether existing strategies sufficiently account for media, arms control experts, and public perceptions of emergent risks. The key findings include:
Year Published:
2024
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SMA Publication

Conceptualizing the Deterrence of Terrorism in the Era of Strategic Competition

Deterring terrorism literature began as a reaction following the events of September 11, 2001. Since that time, there has been fairly robust research that applied deterrence theory to terrorism, terrorists, and violent non-state actors in general. This paper explores both the innovations and pitfalls of deterring terrorism scholarship while arguing for conceptual precision in defining levels of analysis as well as the alignment of influence mechanisms and desired outcomes when thinking about deterrence as applied to countering terrorism. This paper begins with a summary of the existent literature on deterring terrorism, focused on theoretical reconceptualization and expansion of deterrence theory as scholars attempted to apply the deterrence framework to terrorism.
Year Published:
2024
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SMA Publication

Irregular Warfare

This publication was released as part of the SMA project “21st Century Strategic Deterrence Frameworks.” (SDF) For more information regarding this project, please click here.
Year Published:
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SMA Publication

Russian Nuclear Rhetoric 2014-2023: Transatlantic Differences in Threat Perception

After decades of discourse on disarmament and non-proliferation, the war in Ukraine has effectively marked the return of nuclear weapons to both mainstream public rhetoric and military-policy planning, and highlighted the growing importance of strategic deterrence. Russia’s progressively more intense nuclear saber-rattling over the past decade is partly due to an updated NATO posture and gradual commitments by Western nuclear powers to update their arsenals.
Year Published:
2024
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SMA Publication

Chinese Strategic Deterrence Frameworks

China does not have an overarching deterrence framework. However, it is possible to identify the primary objects of Chinese deterrence and describe the Chinese playbook. China’s core strategic aims consist of deterring 1) a nuclear attack; 2) conventional, space, and cyber-attacks; and 3) outside efforts to encourage secession or political unrest. Nuclear deterrence has traditionally taken the approach that a secure second-strike capability is sufficient to prevent an adversary from threatening first use.
Year Published:
2024
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SMA Publication

NATO Strategic Foresight Analysis, Drivers of a Pervasive Competition

The Strategic Foresight Analysis 2023 (SFA23) provides a shared understanding of the Evolving Security Environment to 2043, thus establishing the context for Allied futures thinking. Based on this context, the Future Operating Environment 2024 (FOE24) will address the military problem sets for Allied Warfare Development. FOE24 will also serve as a baseline for further conceptual and strategic thinking. The renewed foresight cycle, consisting of SFA23, FOE24 and deployable foresight analytics capacities, will facilitate collective futures thinking within the Alliance, as well as augment individual Ally’s foresight capabilities.
Year Published:
2024
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SMA Publication

Deterrence Effects of Policing Programs

While there are parallels, the environment in which deterrence occurs for the U.S. Military is vastly different in context than for domestic or international law enforcement.‍
Year Published:
2023
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SMA Publication

Considering How and Why Deterrence Works in Public Health

Public health experts often approach “deterrence”—or prevention of behaviors and/or decisions that adversely affect health outcomes—by considering the many factors that influence health behaviors and decision-making. These factors, often called “health determinants,” can be divided into three levels: micro- (individual), meso- (social/community), and macro- (systems). Interventions to influence health-related decision-making at each level have been developed, tested, and refined for a variety of public health deterrence efforts.
Year Published:
2023
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SMA Publication

Russian Strategic Deterrence Frameworks

This paper is structured around four key sections, each answering a core question. First,what is the relationship between Russia’s core strategic goals and the foundations of Russian strategic deterrence? Second, how has Russian strategic nuclear thought evolved from the Stalinist era to the present and, third, how can Russia’s approach to deterrence be contextualized within Moscow’s larger strategic competition with the US? Fourth, how does Russia’s approach to deterrence in the context of the Ukraine war currently impact the ways in which the West engages Russia?
Year Published:
2023
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SMA Publication

Strategic Culture Literature Review

The concept of strategic culture emerges in discussions of both tailored and integrated deterrence. This report examines the concept’s history, current consensus, and enduring debates about what it entails. It also proposes a model of strategic culture as a complex system.
Year Published:
2023
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SMA Publication

Tri-polar Deterrence

During the cold war the conventional wisdom was that an all-out war between the United States and the Soviet Union was all but precluded. The key to this strategic nirvana was a carefully calibrated balance of strategic weapons and the high costs associated with nuclear conflict. The policy that was credited tobringing this state of affairs about was labeled Mutual Assured Destruction, or MAD. Each side threatened to obliterate the other if it were attacked.
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SMA Publication

Miniaturization as a Grail in the Third Nuclear Age

Instability of the international system and order is arising from competition among great powers, who possess large, thermonuclear arsenals, and from greater multipolarity of both established and aspirational nuclear weapons states to exercise their own aims for possessing “tactical-size” yields. The capacity of the United States arsenal to deter a nuclear attack on its partners and/or allies—as affirmed in the combined 2022 National Defense Strategy and Nuclear Posture Review—will be challenged in an emerging Third Nuclear Age by threats of nuclear weapons use with far lower yields (i.e., tactical or non-strategic nuclear weapons) than those of the Cold War.
Year Published:
2023
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SMA Publication

SMA SEEK Results: Expanding US Nuclear Capability & Pessimism About Nuclear Use in the Next 15 Years

In August 2021, many of you participated in SMA’s inaugural Survey for Eliciting Expert Knowledge (SEEK) outreach. SEEK is SMA’s new, online capability for tapping into the collective knowledge, experience, and wisdom of our 5000+ person community of interest to generate crowdsourced insights on questions of interest. We conducted two surveys as part of this inaugural SEEK—one on deterrence and strategic stability, and a second on perceptions of threats and opportunities among US competitors. Perhaps surprisingly, we found:
Year Published:
2022
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SMA Publication

SMA 21st Century Strategic Challenges: Strategy and Planning for Diterrence and Triterrence

This NSI Reachback report is part of an effort requested by USSTRATCOM to the Strategic Multi-layer Assessment Office, Joint Staff (J39). The essence of the question is how to develop an approach for assessing and developing strategy in the current environment.
Year Published:
2021
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SMA Publication

China’s Historical Plutonium Production

In this paper, we reevaluate China’s production of weapons-grade plutonium (WGPu) in order to estimate the maximum number of nuclear weapons using WGPu that China could build.† This WGPu was produced in the 801 Reactor at the 404 Plant in Gansu Province (or the 404 Plant reactor) and the 821 Plant reactor in Sichuan Province. Both are graphite-moderated, light-water-cooled production reactors that began operation in late 1966 and late 1973, respectively, and both have been shut down for decades (with the date of termination at issue between different authors). We know of no openly available information indicating that China has resumed WGPu production elsewhere.
Year Published:
2021
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SMA Publication

Guide to Analytic Techniques for Nuclear Strategy Analysis

This Guide to Analytic Techniques, developed for SMA’s 2011 Concepts & Analysis Of Nuclear Strategy (CANS) project for USSTRATCOM, is offered in response to the following question from SMA’s 2021 Reachback Effort on Risk of Strategic Deterrence Failure.
Year Published:
2021
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SMA Publication

Modeling Risk of Strategic Deterrence Failure

George Mason University (GMU) worked with Strategic Multilayer Assessment (SMA) Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) to model risk of strategic deterrence failure, identify potential indicators and factors the U.S. and its partners can influence, and explain this risk to members of Congress and other organizations in a position to influence strategies to protect against a catastrophic strategic deterrence failure. The model examines strategic deterrence risk using an adversary restraint-centric course of action (COA) selection approach that decomposes into two primary causes of deterrence failure: (1) Adversary perceived need to act (adversely to U.S. interests) and (2) adversary perceived advantage after executing the COA and experiencing a likely U.S. response. The strength of this approach is that by understanding the adversary’s perceived need to act due to a scenario, the U.S. and its partners can take steps to influence selection of a COA that meets the adversary’s need to act but does not undermine U.S. vital interests or national survival. Recognizing that the U.S. may have limited control of the scenario, the report further decomposes the risk factors to suggest Adversary COA selection Causal Factors that the U.S. can influence as a means to deter critically unacceptable actions from a U.S. perspective. It also describes an approach to identify indications and warnings of an impending situation that could lead an adversary to contemplate courses of action posing threats to U.S. vital interests or national survival.
Year Published:
2021
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SMA Publication

The Challenge of Russia’s Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons: Western Air Supremacy as One Russian Justification for NSNW

Significant and enduring US/NATO advantages in aircraft and precision-guided munitions drives the Russian need for a varied and large stock of non-strategic nuclear weapons (NSNW). NATO nations, particularly those on the eastern periphery of the alliance, perceive a need for this defensive air combat capability to ensure their security. Russia views events – such as the Kosovo War and Desert Storm – as validating its fear that these capabilities could be used offensively against it. Moreover, for historical and geographical reasons, Russia is apprehensive about threats all along its dynamic European border. Against large numbers of truly fifth-generation F-22s and F-35s, backed by fourth-plus-generation F- 15EXs and Block III F-18E/Fs, Russian air defenders will likely experience high early attrition rates in a military conflict. The United States is expected to retain this advantage well into the future, as it is already flight testing is latest sixth-generation fighter aircraft. Based on this firm sense of technological and numerical inferiority, Russian political and military leadership perceives the need for a range of non- strategic nuclear capabilities.
Year Published:
2021
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SMA Publication

The Escalatory Attraction of Limited Nuclear Employment For Great Power Competitors of the United States

The United States has entered into a dangerously new era in which, for the first time in our nation’s history, we now face two nuclear-armed great power competitors. Over the past three decades, while the United States has been focused on a variety of other national security challenges, Russia and China have observed the “US way of war” and made immense strides to position themselves to successfully counter that. While having achieved some level of success in closing the gap across a wide spectrum of military capabilities and operational realities, those two nuclear-armed peers have concluded not only that limited nuclear employment might be required in any conflict with the United States, but that this is a domain of conflict and level of escalation affording unique advantage for them since it is an area in which the US has neither the perceived will nor the perceived capabilities to compete. This paper discusses that “escalatory attraction” of limited nuclear employment for our great power competitors.
Year Published:
2021
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SMA Publication

Invited Perspective: Anticipating the Effects of Emerging Technologies on Nuclear Deterrence

The effectiveness of nuclear deterrence depends upon mutual confidence in second-strike capabilities – for nuclear deterrence to work, nuclear-armed competitors must all believe that each can absorb a first strike and still return a nuclear response. Emerging technologies being pursued by US competitors that enhance their ability to locate, track, and target nuclear assets, and those that can be used to compromise or to damage components of nuclear communication, command, and control (NC3) erode second-strike and put at risk the future deterrent effectiveness of US strategic forces. The United States can guard against this outcome by modernizing its air- and sea-based nuclear assets, developing resilient and redundant cyber defenses, and actively pursuing international agreements that limit the deleterious effects of ISR and that prohibit kinetic or cyber attacks on terrestrial and satellite-based components of NC3.
Year Published:
2021
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SMA Publication

The Role of Nuclear-Conventional Intermingling on State Decision-making and the Risk of Inadvertent Escalation

In practice, there are three main forms of nuclear-conventional intermingling. First, intermingling between nuclear and non-nuclear weapon systems can occur via the fielding of dual capable delivery systems like missiles or aircraft. Second, intermingling can happen due to the co-location of nuclear and non-nuclear forces and their support structures—for example, the co-location of strategic bombers and general-purpose aircraft, or the co-location of strategic submarines and general-purpose vessels. Third, intermingling can occur via convolving nuclear and conventional military command and control systems, to include ballistic missile early warning and potentially space surveillance systems as well.
Year Published:
2021
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SMA Publication

12th Annual SMA Conference- The Evolving Anatomy of Conflict in a Dynamically Changing World

The 12th Annual SMA Conference, entitled “The Evolving Anatomy of Conflict in a Dynamically Changing World,” was held 21-22 May 2019 at the General Jacob E. Smart Conference Center at Joint Base Andrews in Maryland. The conference theme was defined as:
Year Published:
2019
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SMA Publication

SMA Quick Concepts Series: Extended Deterrence

Extended deterrence encompasses pledges of military protection by a deterrent power to its allies and/or partners against a common potential aggressor. In the US case, these pledges constitute formal military commitments. These commitments can be, and have been, both nuclear and non-nuclear in nature. They imply, and typically reflect, not only common security concerns but also political and operational coordination between the deterrent power and its allies and/or partners.
Year Published:
2019
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SMA Publication

Grand Strategy Alternatives

The SMA Future of Great Power Competition & Conflict project is researching how the United States might strategize to defend its global interests. This paper supports the project in deriving some grand strategy alternatives specifically related to China (twelve) and Russia (ten). The development of the alternatives draws on a broader spectrum of international relation’s theories than the restricted neorealist set generally employ. The study’s aims are to encourage the consideration of tangential approaches, suggest different framing mechanisms that could restructure our thinking about managing great power competition, and briefly outline a range of alternative ways to meet the challenges China and Russia pose.
Year Published:
2019
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SMA Publication

Clash of Strategic Cultures

This paper seeks to describe the cultural and cognitive dissimilarities in how the United States and China pursue strategic competition. The first difference detailed involves how the two societies look at goals and time, as well as how those two factors lead to very different conceptions of strategy. The paper posits that the United States focuses more on a militaristic national security policy while China focuses more on economics and information. Other factors are described that attempt to explain how societal or cultural differences serve to enhance China’s strategy vis-à-vis the United States. Overall, the paper describes a future where China’s model may be more successful in a globalized world, which creates a magnetism for developing countries as well as the corporate sectors of developed countries. The paper concludes by briefly outlining American strengths and how it might use them to create a more effective strategy.
Year Published:
2019
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SMA Publication

SMA Quick Concepts Series: Competition

The conceptual keystone within competition is relative advantage. Due to the fluid, persistent, and continual nature of competition, relative advantage refers to the position between two competitors, (1) either at a given point in time, or (2) in a particular area of competition, or (3) as a generalization of the aggregation of contests within the rivalry.
Year Published:
2019
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SMA Publication

Necessary Conditions For Achieving FFVD Without Militarized Conflict – A Korea Strategic Outcomes Virtual Think Tank Report

[Q3] Under what regional and domestic political, economic, and social conditions would it be possible to achieve final, fully verified denuclearization (FFVD) of the DPRK without resorting to militarized conflict (i.e., what conditions would have had to occur to make that possible)?
Year Published:
2018
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SMA Publication

Conditions Conducive to Enforcing a Non-Proliferation Regime in the Asia Pacific Region – A Korea Strategic Outcomes Virtual Think Tank Report

[Q4] Under what regional and domestic political, economic, and social conditions would it be possible to reinforce a non-proliferation regime in the region including extra-regional sales? What conditions would have had to occur to make that possible?
Year Published:
2018
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SMA Publication

Achieving a Stable Regional Order in the Asia Pacific: What Does the US Need and What Should It Not Negotiate Away – A Korea Strategic Outcomes Virtual Think Tank Report

[Q6] What are the minimum regional and domestic political, economic, and social conditions that are essential for achieving a stable regional order in alignment with US and ally interests? Are there any factors that are sufficient to generate such stability in the region? That is, what should not be negotiated away?
Year Published:
2018
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SMA Publication

Assessment of Possible Reactions in German-Speaking and East Central Europe and the European Union (GS-ECE/EU) to Possible Strategic Outcomes in U.S.-DPRK Relations

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) does not currently constitute a strategic threat via inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) to German-Speaking and East Central Europe (GS-ECE), to the States of the European Union (EU), or to non-EU European States. Proven and potential cyber threats do exist, however, as does the proven threat of traditional espionage.
Year Published:
2018
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SMA Publication

Approaches and Measures to Stabilizing the Korean Peninsula – A Korea Strategic Outcomes Virtual Think Tank Report

This report summarizes the input of 18 insightful responses from the Korea Strategic Outcomes Virtual Think Tank (ViTTa) expert contributors. While this summary response presents an overview of the key expert contributor insights, the summary alone cannot fully convey the fine detail of the contributor inputs provided, each of which is worth reading in its entirety. For this report, the expert contributors consider whether there is anything that the US can do to empower the ROK to negotiate a solution that would remove both the nuclear and conventional instabilities on the Korean Peninsula. This summary details the various perspectives that emerge.
Year Published:
2018
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SMA Publication

Mind Space: Cognition in Space Operations

To conduct deterrence operations, or manage escalation, requires anticipating how others will decide to respond to our actions. Anticipating your adversary is imperative for offense or defense. Thus, it is crucial to understand audiences’ decision-making. But how can you put yourself in the others’ shoes in space operations?
Year Published:
2018
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SMA Speaker Series (Tagged: Deterrence)

SMA Speaker Series

Arctic Strategic Tumult and Technological Resilience

Speaker Session Summary Forthcoming!
July 1, 2025
Gregory Falco and Caroline Kennedy-Pipe
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SMA Speaker Series

China’s Economic, Scientific, and Information Activities in the Arctic: Benign Activities or Hidden Agenda?

China’s research and information-gathering activities in the Arctic have raised security concerns among other Arctic nations, particularly regarding infrastructure, natural resources, data management, and diplomatic influence. China’s involvement in the region began in 1996 with its proposal to establish a temporary research station on the Svalbard Archipelago—an initiative that eventually became permanent. In 2013, China obtained observer status in the Arctic Council and published its first Arctic policy in a 2018 White Paper. Since then, many nations have perceived China’s increasing Arctic activity as both an economic opportunity and as a potential security threat.
June 24, 2025
Dr. Stephanie Pezard
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SMA Speaker Series

Future in the High North: The Role of the Nordics in Meeting the Sino-Russian Challenges

SMA hosted a speaker session with CDR Stefan Lundqvist, PhD(Swedish Defence University) with Guest Host Dr. Nicholas Wright (Intelligent Biology) as part of its SMA EUCOM Speaker Series.
June 4, 2025
Stefan Lundqvist
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SMA Speaker Series

Cyber and Cross-Domain Deterrence

SMA hosted a speaker session presented by Dr. Jacqueline Schneider (US Naval War College) as a part of its SMA STRATCOM Academic Alliance Speaker Series.
May 23, 2018
Dr. Jacquelyn Schneider
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SMA Speaker Series

A Japanese Perspective on Space Deterrence and the Role of the US-Japan Alliance

SMA hosted a speaker session presented by Dr. Kazuto Suzuki (Public Policy School of Hokkaido University, Japan) as a part of its SMA Space Speaker Series. Dr. Suzuki began the session by discussing the importance, indispensability, and vulnerability of space systems, as well as the difficulty of defending and deterring attacks on these systems.
May 1, 2018
Kazuto Suzuki
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SMA Speaker Series

Emerging Strategic & Geopolitical Challenges: Operational Implications for US Combatant Commands

SMA hosted a panel with Mr. Michael A. Clark (Director for Acquisition and Technology (J9), USCYBERCOM), Ms. Kayse Jansen (Branch Chief, Deterrence Analysis and Outreach, Plans and Policy Directorate, USSTRATCOM/J5), Mr. James “JJ” Jenista (Air Force Civilian, Joint Training, Exercise, and Wargaming Directorate (J7), USNORTHCOM & NORAD), Mr. Robert C. Jones (Senior Strategist, USSOCOM J5-JSOU Donovan Integration Group), Mr. Jimmy Krakar (Academic Coordinator, USEUCOM), Ms. Lesley Kucharski (Analyst, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory), Dr. Robert M. Toguchi (Chief, Concepts Division, Force Modernization Directorate (FMD), USASOC), Col David W. Walker (Policy Division Chief, USCENTCOM CCJ5), and Ms. Michele K. Wolfe (Senior Operations Research Analyst, USAFRICOM) as part of its SMA General Speaker Series.
January 25, 2023
Clark, M. (Director for Acquisition and Technology (J9), USCYBERCOM); Jansen, K. (Branch Chief, Deterrence Analysis and Outreach, Plans and Policy Directorate, USSTRATCOM/J5); Jenista, J. (Air Force Civilian, Joint Training, Exercise, and Wargaming Directorate (J7), USNORTHCOM & NORAD); Jones, R. (Senior Strategist, USSOCOM J5-JSOU Donovan Integration Group); Krakar, J. (Academic Coordinator, USEUCOM); Kucharski, L. (Analyst, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory); Toguchi, R. (Chief, Concepts Division, Force Modernization Directorate (FMD), USASOC); Walker, D. (Policy Division Chief, USCENTCOM CCJ5); Wolfe, M. (Senior Operations Research Analyst, USAFRICOM)
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SMA Speaker Series

Deterrence Among Three to Twelve Nuclear Powers: Fundamental Instability and Mitigation Strategy

The fundamental instability of bilateral nuclear deterrence (Albert Wohlstetter’s “delicate balance of terror”) is mitigated, in part, by each adversary deploying and maintaining weapons systems that are capable of guaranteeing a second-strike after an adversary has launched a first-strike.
June 27, 2024
Dr. Claudio Cioffi-Revilla (George Mason University)
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SMA Speaker Series

The Shape of the Future Operating Environment: How Our Adversaries Have Learned to Stop Worrying and Ignore the Bomb

In July of this year, at the request of USSTRATCOM, SMA initiated an effort to address eight questions regarding the implications of the increasing numbers, and expanding capabilities, of US nuclear adversaries.
November 11, 2021
Bragg, B
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SMA Speaker Series

Generating and Employing Mass on the 21st Century Battlefield

SMA hosted a speaker session with Dr. Sidharth Kaushal (Royal United Services Institute) as part of its SMA EUCOM Speaker Series.
May 13, 2025
Dr. Sidharth Kaushal
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SMA Speaker Series

Russia's Military After Ukraine: Potential Pathways for the Postwar Reconstitution of the Russian Armed Forces

The ongoing war in Ukraine is testing Russia’s armed forces in ways they have not experienced in decades.
May 1, 2025
Speakers: Dr. Michelle Grisé, Dr. Krystyna Marcinek, Anna Dowd, and David Woodworth (RAND)
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SMA Speaker Series

The Remilitarization of the Arctic

The Arctic, considered a space of geopolitical cooperation following the Cold War, is increasingly becoming a region of strategic rivalry among Russia, China, and other Arctic states.
April 16, 2025
Speaker: Dr. James Patton Rogers (Brooks Tech Policy Institute, Cornell University)
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SMA Speaker Series

Assessing Deterrence: Understanding Adversary Behaviour and Their Perception of our Behaviour

For Western allies to properly deter unwanted Russian actions, there must be a shared allied perception of Russian threats and behaviors.
April 8, 2025
Catherine Royle
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SMA Speaker Series

Strategic Stability and Emerging Russian and Chinese Technologies

SMA hosted a speaker session with Dr. Juljan Krause (University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation), Dr. Kimberly Peh (Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory), and Dr. Spenser Warren (Harvard Kennedy School of Government’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs) as part of its SMA General Speaker Series.
March 20, 2025
Dr. Juljan Krause, Dr. Kimberly Peh, and Dr. Spenser A. Warren
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SMA Speaker Series

A New Axis of Upheaval? North Korea, Russia, and China—and Why We Should Care

Speaker: Dr. Edward Howell (University of Oxford, Chatham House, Pharos Foundation).
March 12, 2025
‍Dr. Edward Howell
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SMA Speaker Series

Answering Authoritarian State Challenges: Tools for Deterring Russia and China

Information serves as a valuable yet often underutilized tool for deterring China, Russia, and other US adversaries. Dr. Fisher applied the diplomacy, information, military, and economic (DIME) tool framework to demonstrate how information influences China’s behavior.
March 6, 2024
Scott Fisher
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SMA Speaker Series

Nuclear Deterrence in a Two-peer World: Implications for Europe

Speaker: Dr. Max Hoell (Center for Global Security Research at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory).
February 27, 2025
Dr. Max Hoell
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SMA Speaker Series

Incorporating EMS Contestation in Strategic-Level Wargames

Electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) contestation occurs when two or more actors use EMS to gather information or disrupt an adversary’s ability to operate. War games must accurately reflect the prevalence of EMS contestation to prepare participants for real-world scenarios.
February 11, 2024
Ross Buchanan
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SMA Speaker Series

Defending the United States Against Critical Infrastructure Attacks: A Critical Infrastructure Survey and Hypothetical Campaign of Cascading Impacts

Stable and secure critical infrastructure—systems or assets essential to society—serve as a key component of national security and daily life in the United States.
February 4, 2025
Tom Wingfield and Bridget Kane
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SMA Speaker Series

Understanding and Countering China's Maritime Gray Zone Operations

China is seeking to assert control over and advance its interests in large portions of Southeast Asia and the South China Sea (SCS).
January 30, 2025
Dr. Todd Helmus and Dr. Krista Romita Grocholski
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SMA Speaker Series

Russian Subversion, Coercion, and Sabotage throughout Europe

Russian aggression below the threshold of warfare in Europe has increased exponentially since its invasion of Ukraine in 2022.
January 24, 2025
Bojan Pancevski
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SMA Speaker Series

Deterrence and escalation maneuver in a two-peer environment: Developing a new escalation management strategy for the United States

Saudi Arabia and Iran have a deeply rooted rivalry stemming from their contrasting visions for the future of their individual nations and the broader Middle East.
January 8, 2025
Karim Sadjadpour
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SMA Speaker Series

U.S. Military Theories of Victory for a War with the People's Republic of China

The United States has not had to seriously consider conflict escalation with a near-peer adversary that could result in a conflict that ends in large-scale destruction since the Cold War.
November 13, 2024
Jacob Heim and Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga
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SMA Speaker Series

Strategic Culture - A Complex Model for a Complex Concept

In recent years, strategic culture has regained attention as US policymakers work to integrate deterrence strategies with allies and partners while understanding the strategic cultures of adversaries, like China and Russia.
November 19, 2024
Dr. Lawrence A. Kuznar
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SMA Speaker Series

Dynamic Parity: The Nuclear Strategy We Need

Russia, China, and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) are expanding their nuclear capabilities relative to the United States.
October 24, 2024
Adam Lowther, PhD and Curtis McGiffin
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SMA Speaker Series

Ukrainian Resistance to Russian Disinformation: Lessons for Future Conflict

A key element of Ukrainian resistance to the Russian invasion has been its ability to counter Russian disinformation. In their recent report for RAND, Dr. Helmus and Dr. Holynska discuss Ukraine’s approach to combating disinformation and the lessons that the United States and NATO can draw from this effort.
September 19, 2024
Todd Helmus and Khrystyna Holynska
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SMA Speaker Series

The Defender's Dilemma: Why countering grayzone aggression is so difficult (and what options Western governments do have)

Western governments, including the United States, face significant challenges in identifying gray zone aggression. This form of aggression is often difficult to detect before the attack is fully underway, as it can originate from any source at any time.
September 5, 2024
Elisabeth Braw
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SMA Speaker Series

Shades of Grim: Scenarios for Ukraine and Global Order

The ongoing war in Ukraine remains unresolved, and its outcome is widely debated among politicians, researchers, and military practitioners.
July 16, 2024
Luis Simón and Lotje Boswinkel
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SMA Speaker Series

Arms Control Opportunities in the Emerging Two-nuclear-peer Environment

The proliferation of nuclear weapons is increasingly critical to international security, particularly concerning long-standing nuclear-capable adversaries like Russia and China. Both nations have significant geopolitical and security considerations that make bilateral nuclear arms control agreements with the United States unlikely.
May 14, 2024
Amy F. Woolf
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SMA Speaker Series

Assessing the Evolving Russian Nuclear Threat

The changing nuclear rhetoric and actions from Russian leadership during the Ukraine War has put US and Western leaders on edge. Mr. Lokker, in his latest article co-authored for CNAS entitled “Assessing the Evolving Russian Nuclear Threat,” discusses the implications of evolving Russian nuclear discourse and actions.
April 17, 2024
Andrea Kendall-Taylor, Michael Kofman, Nicholas Lokker, and Heli Hautala
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SMA Speaker Series

Measuring Policy Effectiveness of Cyber Deterrence and Defensibility

The United States needs more effective metrics to determine if integrated cyber deterrence is working (as called for in the 2023 cyber strategy for the Department of Defense (DOD)) as expected and to separate these effects from those of improving the overall defensibility of the Internet (as called for in the White House’s National Cybersecurity Strategy).
March 28, 2024
Mr. Jason Healey
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SMA Speaker Series

The Sanctions Response to Russia's Invasion of Ukraine

The sanctions imposed on Russia in response to its past aggressive actions, such as the annexation of Crimea, targeted actors directly involved in its aggression. However, the current sanctions imposed on Russia for its invasion of Ukraine have a much broader scope, encompassing actors and institutions throughout Russian society.
April 11, 2024
Christine Abely
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SMA Speaker Series

Why, What, and How Free Societies Must Develop Effective Deterrence of Actors Intending Bad Ends Given Our GenAI Era

The advent of widespread internet access and the emergence of new forms of generative AI (GenAI) have broken down the physical boundaries that once separated international and intranational communities.
March 13, 2024
Dr. David A. Bray
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SMA Speaker Series

Deterrence and Space Warfare

The strategy of space warfare is a subset of general warfare strategy; therefore, the ideas of deterrence, compellence, and dissuasion have applicability in the space domain.
January 4, 2024
Dr. John Klein
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SMA Speaker Series

Extended Deterrence Across the Continuum of Conflict

Since the end of the Cold War, US extended deterrence has undergone significant evolution, initially appearing to diminish in importance with the perceived decrease in the need for a robust nuclear arsenal following the collapse of the Soviet Union.
February 20, 2024
Dr. Maximilian Hoell
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SMA Speaker Series

North Korea in Regional—and Global—Multi-body Nuclear Strategy

SMA hosted a speaker session with Mr. Markus Garlauskas (Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, Atlantic Council) and Dr. Lauren Sukin (The London School of Economics and Political Science) as part of its SMA “Strategic Deterrence Frameworks” (SDF) Speaker Series.
February 8, 2024
Markus Garlauskas and Lauren Sukin
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SMA Speaker Series

Constructing Killwebs for Effects Based Targeting in Multi-Domain Operations

SMA hosted a speaker session with COL Brian Davis (Northeast Asia Regional Fusion Cell, US Forces Korea) as part of its SMA “Strategic Deterrence Frameworks” (SDF) Speaker Series.
January 9, 2024
Brian R. Davis
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SMA Speaker Series

Building U.S. Responses to Russia’s Threats to Use Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons: A Game Theoretic Analysis of Brinksmanship

SMA hosted a speaker session with Ms. Krista S. Langeland (Deputy Lead, RAND Space Enterprise Initiative; Senior Physical Scientist) and Mr. Clinton Reach (RAND) as part of its SMA “Strategic Deterrence Frameworks” (SDF) Speaker Series.
January 16, 2024
Krista Langeland and Clinton Reach
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SMA Speaker Series

How do Non-State Entities Taking Actions in a Crisis or Conflict Impact Escalation and Deterrence?

SMA hosted a speaker session with Dr. Anna Péczeli (LLNL) as part of its SMA “Strategic Deterrence Frameworks” (SDF) Speaker Series.
December 14, 2023
Dr. Anna Péczeli
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SMA Speaker Series

AI and the Bomb

SMA hosted a speaker session with Dr. James Johnson (University of Aberdeen) as part of its SMA “Strategic Deterrence Frameworks” (SDF) Speaker Series.
October 27, 2023
Dr. James Johnson
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SMA Speaker Series

The Russian Way of Deterrence: Strategic Culture, Coercion, and War

SMA hosted a speaker session with Professor Dmitry (Dima) Adamsky (School of Government, Diplomacy and Strategy at Reichman University) as part of its SMA “Strategic Deterrence Frameworks” (SDF) Speaker Series.
January 23, 2024
Dmitry (Dima) Adamsky
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SMA Speaker Series

China's Use of Armed Coercion: To Win Without Fighting

SMA hosted a speaker session with Mr. James Siebens (Stimson Center) as part of its SMA “Strategic Deterrence Frameworks” (SDF) Speaker Series.China has become a regional power in the Asia-Pacific with minimal use of its armed forces.
December 5, 2023
James A. Siebens
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SMA Speaker Series

British and French Nuclear Thinking in the ‘Three Body Problem’ Era

France and Britain are part of a Western democratic alliance; however, they have developed their own unique perspectives on nuclear deterrence, issues such as the three-body problem, and how to best confront Russian aggression. Both speakers, Dr. Tertais and Professor Chalmers, emphasized that their views were their own and did not represent the opinions of the UK and French government.
December 12, 2023
Dr. Bruno Tertrais and Malcolm Chalmers
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SMA Speaker Series

Deterring the Risks of Simultaneous Conflicts and Limited Nuclear Attacks in East Asia

Fears of a potential conflict between China and either the US or its allies in the Indo-Pacific—especially over Taiwan—are intensifying. A potential conflict with China is worrying Indo-Pacific experts about the potential for renewed aggression from an opportunistic DPRK. Mr. Garlauskas emphasized that the deterrence landscape has been constantly shifting, placing regional US security interests in danger during the oncoming decade. One risk of beginning a conflict with either the DPRK or China is that it will result in a conflict with both states. There are several plausible pathways for Chinese and DPRK aggression that would increase the likelihood to a multi-state conflict in the region. Factors influencing these pathways include factors like opportunism by actors, escalation dynamics, and regional geography. However, because of pre-existing distrust between Chinese and DPRK leadership, a coordinated and simultaneous offensive against the US or its allies in the region is highly unlikely.
October 26, 2023
Markus Garlauskas
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SMA Speaker Series

Alternative Ukrainian Future Trajectories: Implications for Russia and the West

Dr. Graeme Herd at the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies is conducting multiple workshops and seminars, creating predicted pathways for war in Ukraine, using open-source materials. Dr. Herd identified five potential future pathways for the war in Ukraine, being: Ukrainian victory, Russian victory, protracted conflict, frozen conflict, and negotiated peace.
June 22, 2023
‍Dr. Graeme P. Herd
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SMA Speaker Series

The Future of Nuclear Weapons, Statecraft, and Deterrence After Ukraine

The narrative surrounding nuclear deterrence and statecraft has changed since the beginning of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine; particularly Vladimir Putin’s threat of a nuclear strike against Ukraine. Putin’s overt threat of a nuclear strike has caused experts to ask how the US and other democratic actors can promote responsible nuclear statecraft. In spring of 2023, the Perry World House at the University of Pennsylvania hosted a one-day workshop with esteemed panels of experts. In addition to their discussions, the panelists responded to a series of survey questions. They were asked if they believed Russia would be likely to use a nuclear weapon, and topics relating to nuclear statecraft including, the revival of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), nuclear cooperation between the US and China, and the likelihood of the ROK and Japan developing their own nuclear weapons.
October 17, 2023
Thomas Shattuck (Perry World House, University of Pennsylvania)
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SMA Speaker Series

US Strategy and Force Posture for an Era of Nuclear Tripolarity

US nuclear deterrence has changed drastically during the last few decades. One of the factors forcing the US to change its nuclear deterrence doctrine was the emergence of nuclear tripolarity between the US, China, and Russia. How states manage nuclear deterrence and geopolitics has become an area of focus for media outlets and civil leaders amid Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and China’s fast growing nuclear arsenal. Dr. Press stated that unless the US changes its current nuclear doctrine, focusing on how the US conducts nuclear deterrence and chooses targets for retaliatory strikes, then there is a strong likelihood that there will be a trilateral nuclear arms race. Current US doctrine has three principle missions: 1) deter a nuclear strike, 2) assure allies of the US’s commitment to protect international stability, and 3) mitigate the consequences if deterrence fails.
September 6, 2023
Dr. Keir Lieber (Georgetown University) and Dr. Daryl Press (Dartmouth College)
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SMA Speaker Series

US Command Perspectives on Campaigning in Support of Integrated Deterrence

The complex nature of the modern threat environment and geopolitical competition, especially competition in the gray zone, has caused many scholars and military leaders to study how all Combatant Commands can combine their resources and capabilities to conduct effective integrated deterrence. This panel was comprised of the authors of a SMA Perspectives Publication: U.S. Command Perspectives on Campaigning in Support of Integrated Deterrence (Volume IV). During this panel the authors, from USAFRICOM, USCYBERCOM, NORAD and USNORTHCOM, USSOCOM, and USSTRATCOM commands, addressed how individually and cumulatively the Combatant Commands can best conduct integrated deterrence in a sustained campaign. The speakers detailed how a successful long-term campaign will create enduring advantages for the US and its allies across the many warfighting domains.
August 10, 2023
Ms. Michele Wolfe (USAFRICOM), Drs. Emily Goldman and Michael Warner (USCYBERCOM), Mr. James “JJ” Jenista (USNORTHCOM and NORAD), Mr. Robert Jones (USSOCOM), Mr. Howard Simkin (USASOC), Ms. Kayse Jansen (USSTRATCOM)
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SMA Speaker Series

Nuclear Intimidation: A Russian Success Story

Russia’s long-term information operations (IO) and influence campaigns have altered how US and Western decision makers perceive the risk level of Russia using a nuclear weapon. Russian IO are designed to influence the decision makers through several levers, including through their constituents. These IO use multi-domain approaches such as Russia’s own domestic media. Mr. Giles pointed out that most Russian media is broadcast in many countries, giving it a wide reach and large non-Russian audience. An example of this targeted use of media is Russian news showing the trajectory needed for Russian missiles to strike specific European cities—even though the Russian missile system required to launch the missiles is believed to be offline. The Kremlin uses long-term IO to convince its adversaries that it is willing to use a nuclear missile if contested.
September 5, 2023
Professor Keir Giles (Chatham House)
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SMA Speaker Series

Using a Nuclear Security & Nonproliferation Approach to Reduce US-PRC Escalation Risks in a DPRK Collapse Scenario

Despite the deep freeze in US-China relations, the US and China have mutual interests that could reduce risk in a future DPRK regime collapse scenario. The US and China have prior experience successfully collaborating on nonproliferation initiatives, including standards for nuclear facilities and security measures relating to the storage and transportation of nuclear material. US and Chinese scientists have also collaborated in unstable and conflict-ridden countries, such as Nigeria, to collect and clean nuclear waste. Moreover, the US and China have signed bilateral nuclear agreements in the past and are two of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, or P5. Their status as P5 countries provides the US and China an easy avenue for communication and litigation. Dr. Anderson stated that the US can try to increase bilateral communication, collaboration, and invite Chinese scientists to observe or participate in future nuclear exercises or try and better bilateral political relations in this DPRK regime collapse scenario. South Korea can also play a role in increasing the awareness surrounding denuclearization by hosting UN security conferences.
June 8, 2023
Dr. Justin Anderson (NDU)
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SMA Speaker Series

China's Emergence as a Second Nuclear Peer: Implications for US Nuclear Deterrence

The deterrence landscape has changed drastically and quickly during the decades since the Cold War. In response to these changes, USSTRATCOM is reforming its nuclear deterrence strategy to protect against emerging short-term nuclear threats and the long-term threat of nuclear parity with two adversarial nations, Russia and China. Dr. Roberts commented that the rewriting of US nuclear deterrence inspired the report from the Center for Global Security at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, which was written by a diverse working group, and includes more than 100 different findings and recommendations. The group examined how the US can prepare both militarily and politically for competition with two near-peer nuclear adversaries. He emphasized that while short-term nuclear competition is a triad between the US, China, and Russia, both North Korea and Iran could emerge as disruptive nuclear actors in the future. The report gives recommendations for the required size of the overall US nuclear arsenal and the required nuclear force in each military theatre.
June 21, 2023
Dr. Bradford Roberts (LLNL)
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SMA Speaker Series

Russian Nuclear Orthodoxy: Religion, Coercion and the Russian Way of War

The Kremlin is blending its nuclear discourse, politics, and theological beliefs, changing the domestic perception in Russia regarding just nuclear war and nuclear escalation with the West. Prof. Adamsky stated that the Kremlin has been integrating the Russian Orthodox Church in its military campaigns for many years. The use of the Orthodox Church in Russian military operations has traditionally been to provide spiritual and psychological support for troops, bolstering individual and unit moral while reaffirming Russian soldiers’ belief in their cause. The Kremlin also uses Orthodoxy to justify its military activities to other state leaders, depicting Russia’s conflicts as good against evil. However, the war in Ukraine is forcing the Russian Orthodox Church to address the cognitive disconnect many Russians feel when fighting fellow Orthodox Christians in Ukraine.
July 19, 2023
Professor Dmitry Adamsky (Reichman University)
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SMA Speaker Series

How Strategy Must Align to Strategic Environments: Deterrence and Initiative Persistence

There have been several strategic paradigm shifts relating to deterrence, coercion, and security across the entire spectrum of conflict and competition. Using the proper deterrence and coercion strategy in the right domain is crucial to success. Dr. Harknett emphasized that the development of initiative persistence is key to building security and effective deterrence in all domains, especially cyber. Security in cyber space is reliant on very different factors than security in conventional warfighting domains. Cyber security relies on partnerships between public and private entities in a whole of government effort that uses an active defense, or forward defense. While forward defense is proactive, it is not aggressive. The current forward defense strategy includes improving defenses of foreign allied networks, improving allied understanding of adversarial tactics, techniques, and procedures, and increasing the resilience of US domestic networks by coordinating with the private sector.
May 10, 2023
Dr. Richard Harknett (University of Cincinnati)
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SMA Speaker Series

Outcompeting China in Space: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Integrated Deterrence

SMA hosted a speaker session with Dr. John “Patsy” Klein (Falcon Research, Inc.; George Washington University’s Space Policy Institute) and Mr. Dean Cheng (Potomac Institute for Policy Studies; Users Advisory Group of the National Space Council) as part of its SMA “Strategic Deterrence Frameworks” (SDF) Speaker Series.The US and China are locked in a grand geopolitical competition that includes continuous use of deterrence against each other. Mr. Cheng emphasized that China and the US conceptualize deterrence very differently. The US primarily conceives of deterrence as a dissuasive tool used to preemptively stop an adversary’s aggression, while the primary Chinese conceptualization of deterrence, wēi-shè, also includes coercion. China approaches wēi-shè holistically, using many different leverages of national power, such as economic deals. Sometimes, the US is unprepared to deter adversaries because it prepares to deter actors that mirror itself, commented Dr. Klein.
February 28, 2023
Dean Cheng, (Senior Fellow, Potomac Institute for Policy Studies; Senior Adviser, United States Institute of Peace); and Dr. John Klein (Senior Fellow and Strategist, Falcon Research, Inc.)
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SMA Speaker Series

Understanding Russian Coercive Signaling

The Russian military has used coercive signaling as a tool to compel and deter the US and its allies in Eastern Europe. Dr. Charap clarified that the study was completed before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and it focuses on Russian actions below the threshold of kinetic force. These coercive actions have been increasing in frequency since 2014 and can be classified as low-level incidents, including violations of air or maritime space. Some incidents were simply the result of high amounts of traffic by the Russian military along its borders, particularly the flyway between St. Petersburg and Leningrad. Other instances, including the interception of US-B52 bombers by a Russian Su-27 fighter jet, are interpreted as being more targeted and aggressive. In this instance, voice recordings of the Russian fighter pilot and its commanders were attained and used to prove that it intercepted the US bomber intentionally and outside of Russian air space.
January 18, 2023
Dr. Samuel Charap (RAND) and Dr. Andrew Stravers (RAND)
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SMA Speaker Series

The 2022 NDS in Its Historical and Strategic Big Picture: Expert Q&A

The 2022 release of the US National Defense Strategy (NDS) gives an in-depth look into the prioritization of US national security concerns and capabilities. Dr. Posen argued that it is where the military meets politics. He wishes that the NDS was more descriptive in some areas, including who the US’s partners and allies are and clearer definitions of deterrence by punishment and denial. The initial statements in the new NDS emphasize the need for prioritizing operations, threats, and resource allocation. However, Dr. Posen believes that the paper loses its focus on prioritization quickly. This prioritization needed to be further emphasized because the document discusses the importance of assisting US allies and partners with the resources they need for deterrence.
December 15, 2022
Dr. Barry Posen (Ford International Professor of Political Science, MIT; Director Emeritus, Security Studies Program, MIT); and Prof. Christopher Coker (Director, London School of Economics [LSE] IDEAS)
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SMA Speaker Series

Lost Seoul? Assessing Pyongyang's Other Deterrent

North Korea poses many military threats to its neighbor, South Korea, including a massive artillery barrage on its capital city, Seoul. A conventional artillery barrage would destroy infrastructure and threaten the lives of civilians living in the metropolitan area. Dr. Press and Dr. Anderson built a model, mapping the loss of civilian life during three specific scenarios: a) a surprise attack by North Korea during peacetime, b) a North Korean attack during a military crisis, and c) a preemptive US and South Korean attack. To determine the total loss of civilian casualties, the model considers the known number of North Korean artillery batteries, their predicted rate of fire, and their predicted overall effectiveness among other variables. Dr. Press estimated that North Korea has around 300 artillery batteries that can currently bombard Seoul.
November 29, 2022
Anderson, N. (Elliott School of International Affairs, The George Washington University); Press, D. (Dartmouth College)
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SMA Speaker Series

Exercising to Deter: The Australian Navy's Experience with Strategic Communication

On August 2, 2022, US Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi visited Taipei, Taiwan, triggering a series of Chinese military activities around the island. These activities presented an opportunity to observe how China and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) might conduct a future blockade of Taiwan. Prof. Lockyer argued that China’s public display of these exercises was intentional. China sought to convey a strategic message to nations across the globe that China could implement such a blockade; therefore, Taiwan should be hesitant to take any further actions towards independence. This recent example illustrates how sea power can serve as an incredibly flexible tool and shape the strategic environment as a deterrence strategy.
November 17, 2022
Lockyer, A. (Macquarie University)
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SMA Speaker Series

Implications of China’s Nuclear Modernization and Expansion

China is modernizing its nuclear forces which is routine for modern nuclear countries; however, the speed and acceleration of China’s modernization is alarming Western leaders and scholars. Ms. Bradley commented that by growing its nuclear forces, China is creating nuclear capabilities to match their geopolitical ambitions, including regional hegemony. As China increases its nuclear capabilities, its adversaries will need to increase their levels of deterrence to maintain the geopolitical status quo. The characteristics of China’s nuclear deterrence can be described as focused, limited, and defensive. Historically, China has maintained a ‘no first strike’ policy. As it increases its nuclear capabilities, this policy may change. Its recent escalation of its nuclear forces represents a change in its nuclear strategy, not its security environment.
November 1, 2022
Bradley, J. (Plans and Policy Directorate, United States Strategic Command)
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SMA Speaker Series

Analyzing the Gray Zone

The Gray Zone is defined differently by many organizations, academics, and think tanks. Dr. Potter commented that despite Gray Zone being used mostly as a trendy term relating to strategic competition, its concepts were created from real life obstacles facing decision makers. However, because it has many different definitions, the Gray Zone is difficult to encapsulate using analytical tools. Inconsistencies among the multiple definitions of “Gray Zone” inhibit effective conversations and the term Gray Zone can be used too frequently as a political talking point. Additionally, the academic literature discussing the Gray Zone is lacking. There are many reports from think tanks, but few academic articles that discuss what the Gray Zone is and its implications for modern strategic competition.
October 19, 2022
Potter, P. (Associate Professor of Politics and Founding Director of the National Security Policy Center, University of Virginia)
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SMA Speaker Series

Towards a Third Nuclear Age?

The world is undergoing an era of nuclear transition while the mechanisms normally used to control these transitions are being placed under stress. Moreover, technological, geopolitical, and normative changes can influence the nuclear ecosystem and how actors handle nuclear threats and understand nuclear technology. Mr. Futter argued that this nuclear transition is a global and multifaceted phenomenon. He separated nuclear transitions into three-time frames: a) the first nuclear age (1945-1990), b) the second nuclear age (1990s-2014), and c) the third nuclear age (2018-present). These ages are defined by actors’ policy choices and the number of actors acquiring nuclear power.
September 8, 2022
Futter, A. (Professor of International Politics, University of Leicester, UK)
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SMA Speaker Series

Long Shadows: Deterrence in a Multipolar Nuclear Age

Dr. Pettyjohn explained that nuclear deterrence is frequently examined in the context of a bilateral competition rather than a multipolar competition between three or more nuclear capable states.
July 26, 2022
Pettyjohn, S. (Senior Fellow & Director of the Defense Program, Center for a New American Security [CNAS])
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SMA Speaker Series

Technology and the Soldier’s Will to Fight—How Can We Foster Courage in Our New Era?

Military leaders have long sought to understand what enables soldiers to willingly engage in combat and other dangerous activities. New technologies relating to the mind-tech nexus may allow scholars and leaders to understand why soldiers decide to place themselves in harm’s way, and even encourage it.
June 28, 2022
Dr. Reuven Gal, Dr. Ben Connable, Dr. Aaron Frank
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SMA Speaker Series

Multi-Actor Deterrence: Why Multiple Perceptions Matter

SMA hosted a speaker session with Dr. Michelle Black (Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Nebraska Omaha; Director for Workforce Development and Education, National Counterterrorism, Innovation, Technology and Education (NCITE); Research Fellow, National Strategic Research Institute, University of Nebraska; Co-Editor, Space and Defense Journal) as part of its SMA STRATCOM Academic Alliance Series.
April 26, 2022
Dr. Michelle Black Biography
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SMA Speaker Series

The Evolving Requirements for Extended Deterrence and Allied Assurance in the Indo-Pacific

SMA hosted a speaker session with Dr. Shane Smith (Director, Air Force Institute for National Security Studies, US Air Force Academy) and Dr. Justin Anderson (Senior Policy Fellow, Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction, National Defense University) as part of its SMA INDOPACOM Speaker Series.
April 27, 2022
Dr. Justin Anderson and Dr. Shane Smith
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SMA Speaker Series

The Surprisingly Unsurprising Russo-Ukraine War: Learning and Teaching the Right Lessons for Integrated Deterrence

SMA hosted a speaker session with Dr. Spencer Meredith (National Defense University), Dr. Peter Eltsov (National Defense University), Prof. Carolyne Davidson (National Defense University), and Maj. Gen. Patrick B. Roberson (Commander and Commandant, US Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, Fort Bragg) as part of its SMA EUCOM Speaker Series.
April 8, 2022
Dr. Spencer Meredith, Dr. Peter Eltsov, and Professor Carolyne Davidson
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SMA Speaker Series

Escalation Management in Gray Zone Crises: A Proposed Toolkit

SMA hosted a speaker session with Mr. Devin Hayes Ellis (University of Maryland), Lt Gen (Ret) Robert Elder, PhD (George Mason University), and Dr. Allison Astorino-Courtois (NSI) as part of its SMA General Speaker Series.
March 22, 2022
Dr. Allison Astorino-Courtois and Lieutenant General Robert Elder (USAF, retired)
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SMA Speaker Series

Stabilizing Great Power Rivalries

SMA hosted a speaker session with Dr. Michael Mazarr (RAND) and Dr. Samuel Charap (RAND) as part of its SMA EUCOM/INDOPACOM Speaker Series.
March 3, 2022
Dr. Michael Mazarr and Dr. Samuel Charap
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SMA Speaker Series

Russian Approaches to Strategic Deterrence and Tactical Coercion

SMA hosted a speaker session with Dr. Samuel Charap (Senior Political Scientist, RAND) as part of its SMA EUCOM Speaker Series.
February 24, 2022
Samuel Charap
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SMA Speaker Series

Poland's New Model Army

SMA hosted a speaker session with Dr. Jacek Bartosiak (Founder and Owner, Strategy & Future; Senior Analyst, Geopolitical Futures) as part of its SMA EUCOM Speaker Series.
February 4, 2022
Jacek Bartosiak
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SMA Speaker Series

Restrictive Deterrence in Cyberspace: Findings from a Series of Online Field Experiments

Cyber-attacks have increasingly become a more prevalent national security threat since 2000; however, deterrence literature rarely mentions cyberspace.
February 3, 2022
Dr. David Maimon
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SMA Speaker Series

Integrating Deterrence Across the Gray—Making It More Than Words

SMA hosted a speaker session with Mr. Robert Jones (USSOCOM), LTC Catherine Crombe (USSOCOM SOCCENT), and LTC Steven Ferenzi (USSOCOM SOCCENT) as part of its SMA General Speaker Series.
December 8, 2021
Lt. Col. Katie Crombe, Lt.Col. Steve Ferenzi, and Mr. Robert C. Jones
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SMA Speaker Series

The Real and Present Risk of Low-Yield Nuclear Weapons on the Battlefield

Russia’s and China’s status as near-peer nuclear competitors with the US is changing the reality of what a military conflict would look like.
January 12, 2022
Dr. Adam Lowther
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SMA Speaker Series

Challenges to 21st Century Deterrence (Part III)

As US adversaries reach nuclear parity—or near nuclear parity—with the US, multi-actor deterrence is becoming more prevalent in global influence competition.
January 10, 2022
Dr. Allison Astorino-Courtois
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SMA Speaker Series

Challenges to 21st Century Deterrence (Part I)

SMA hosted a panel discussion with Mr. Benjamin W. Bahney (Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory [LLNL]), Dr. Anna Péczeli (Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory [LLNL]), and Dr. Melanie Sisson (Brookings Institution) as part of its SMA STRATCOM Risk of Strategic Deterrence Failure Speaker Series..
December 3, 2021
Benjamin Bahney, Anna Péczeli, and Melanie W. Sisson
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SMA Speaker Series

Challenges to 21st Century Deterrence (Part II)

SMA hosted a panel discussion with Lt Gen (Ret) Robert Elder, PhD (George Mason University), Mr. James A. Siebens (Defense Strategy & Planning Program, Stimson Center), and Dr. Christopher Yeaw (National Strategic Research Institute, University of Nebraska) as part of its SMA STRATCOM Risk of Strategic Deterrence Failure Speaker Series.
December 10, 2021
Lieutenant General Robert Elder, James A. Siebens, and Dr. Christopher Yeaw
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SMA Speaker Series

Deterrence and Defense Strategy: Old Lessons and New Contexts

SMA hosted a speaker session with Dr. Carter Malkasian (CNA) as part of its SMA STRATCOM Academic Alliance Speaker Session.
November 3, 2021
Dr Carter Malkasian
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SMA Speaker Series

Deterring Iran in the Gray Zone: Insights from Four Decades of Conflict

Iran has been increasing its gray zone activities to compete geopolitically with the US and other rivals. Mr. Eisenstadt commented that states which are not content with the geopolitical status quo, like China, Russia, and Iran, will increase their gray zone activities.
October 4, 2021
Michael Eisenstadt
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SMA Speaker Series

The Challenges of Multipolar Deterrence: Theory and Evidence

More countries building nuclear weapons forces the US to conduct multipolar nuclear deterrence and balance its political relationships in a way that it never has before.
September 29, 2021
Vipin Narang
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SMA Speaker Series

A Resilient Cyber Policy for the Indo-Pacific

When deciding how to best confront China’s regional cyber capabilities, the US should first assess the state of the Indo-Pacific cyber threat and its allies’ capabilities to protect themselves, stressing resilience and communication.
October 21, 2021
Dr. Brandon Kirk Williams
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SMA Speaker Series

The Delicate Balance of Survivability: New Insights from Game Theory on How Missile Defense and Counterforce Impact Strategic Stability and Deterrence

SMA hosted a speaker session with Mr. Benjamin Bahney (Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory) and Dr. Braden Soper (Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory)as part of its SMA STRATCOM Risk of Strategic Deterrence Failure Speaker Series.
September 2, 2021
Benjamin Bahney and Braden Soper
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SMA Speaker Series

Key Elements of the 2021 Nuclear Posture Review

SMA hosted a speaker session with Dr. Anna Péczeli (Postdoctoral Research Fellow, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory) as part of its SMA STRATCOM Risk of Strategic Deterrence Failure Speaker Series.The purpose of a Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) is to assess the current nuclear threat environment, outline nuclear deterrence policy and strategy for the next 5-10 years, and align participating countries’ nuclear forces. Dr. Péczeli reviewed the similarities and differences of past US Nuclear Posture Reviews. Several similarities of past NPRs include: a) deciding against a no first use policy, b) deciding against a sole purpose posture, c) maintaining a form of negative security assurance, and d) excepting a level of calculated ambiguity for nuclear retaliation. This level of ambiguity relating to nuclear retaliation allows for the use of nuclear weapons in extreme circumstance.
July 22, 2021
Anna Péczeli
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SMA Speaker Series

What Deters and Why in Taiwan, Korea, and the Gray Zone

RAND’s study on deterrence focused on two phases: interstate and gray zone aggression. Dr. Mazarr began by stating that interstate deterrence is often incorrectly associated with military presence, which is only one variable considered in overall deterrence. Clear and consistent messaging can often deter an adversary from taking an aggressive action before a military conflict ever starts. The potential aggressor’s perception of its adversary and whether the potential aggressor views the adversary’s messages as credible are more meaningful variables relating to overall deterrence. Ultimately, if a messenger can communicate to an aggressor that it can achieve its objectives through nonmilitary means, then military conflict will likely be avoided.
April 28, 2021
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SMA Speaker Series

Protection’s Price: Reassurance and Burden-Sharing in U.S. Alliances

SMA hosted a speaker session as a part of its SMA STRATCOM Academic Alliance Speaker Series, entitled “Protection’s Price: Reassurance and Burden-Sharing in US Alliances.” The speaker was Dr. Brian Blankenship (University of Miami).Dr. Blankenship began his presentation by discussing the conditions under which the United States is more or less likely to be successful in persuading its allies to assume more responsibility for their own defense. Concerns about burden-sharing in US alliances are not new; many US presidents have made this issue a priority. On the other hand, these efforts have had varying levels of success. In some cases, US policymakers have been successful in their attempts to encourage allies to spend more on defense, as in the case of Jimmy Carter and South Korean defense spending. By contrast, US pressure has been less successful in other cases. For example, Lyndon Johnson attempted to pressure Great Britain into maintaining its military presence in the Middle East, but he was ultimately unsuccessful. According to Dr. Blankenship, conventional wisdom demonstrated that burden-sharing is quite difficult to achieve in asymmetric alliances between great powers and their smaller allies. US troop presence is conducive to free-riding by allies. In other words, allies lack incentives when the US has such a dominant presence worldwide.
December 10, 2020
Brian Blankenship
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SMA Speaker Series

Extended Deterrence in Doubt? Possible German Futures: 2021

SMA hosted a speaker session as a part of its SMA STRATCOM Academic Alliance Speaker Series, featuring Dr. David Dorondo (Western Carolina University).Dr. Dorondo began his presentation by discussing the tumultuous time that nations on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean are experiencing, while highlighting the political evolutions occurring in the US, the EU, and NATO. In Germany, 2021 holds a number of important state elections and a national election in which a new chancellor will be elected. However, Dr. Dorondo argued that it is important to bear in mind that any doubt about nuclear sharing in Germany as we approach the 2021 electoral year is nothing new. That said, it is also imperative to consider the necessity for nuclear sharing in support of transatlantic cooperation. Germany and other Non-Nuclear Weapons States (NNWS) in NATO have a vested interest in what is sometimes called “nuclear decoupling” from the US. Theoretically speaking, the European states within NATO and the EU could achieve strategic autonomy logistically; however, there is not significant enough collective will to establish that strategic autonomy, Dr. Dorondo argued. He then stressed that the US and NATO must continue not only to deter but also assure and reassure in all domains.
October 27, 2020
Dr. David R. Dorondo
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SMA Speaker Series

The Lapsing Arms Embargo on Iran: Challenges, Change, Iranian Military Modernization, and US Responses

SMA hosted a speaker session as a part of its SMA CENTCOM Speaker Series, featuring Mr. Behnam Ben Taleblu (Foundation for Defense of Democracies).Mr. Taleblu’s presentation focused on the lapsing UN arms embargo on Iran. He stated that four primary groups are affected by the expiration of the arms embargo: 1) those who are interested in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA); 2) the US sanctions community; 3) those in the US military who are looking at Iran’s conventional and asymmetric capabilities; and 4) those employed by multilateral or international organizations, or by non-government organizations that do diplomacy with UN Security Council (UNSC) member nations. Mr. Taleblu also provided a brief history of US arms embargoes against Iran, beginning with that of 1979 (during the Islamic Revolution and the Iranian hostage crisis).
October 10, 2020
Behnam Ben Taleblu
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SMA Speaker Series

U.S. Nuclear Policy from the Cold War to 2020—A Comparative Analysis of the Nuclear Posture Reviews

SMA hosted a speaker session presented by Dr. Anna Péczeli (Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory [LLNL]) as a part of its SMA STRATCOM Academic Alliance Speaker Series. Dr. Péczeli first stated that the main role of the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) is for the current administration to assess the threat environment, outline nuclear deterrence policy and strategy for the next five to ten years, and align the country’s nuclear forces accordingly. She elaborated that, depending on the time and which administration was in office, the threats and challenges of the time and the scope of the NPR differ. Furthermore, the NPR is only the “tip of the iceberg” regarding US nuclear guidance because it is the only substantive document that individuals can access in the unclassified domain; the actual employment guidelines and operational capabilities behind US nuclear guidance are classified and much more complex. Dr. Péczeli proceeded to provide a brief history of each NPR to date. President Clinton’s NPR in 1994 focused on deterrence requirements in a post-Cold War period. She stated that the main threats the US faced at the time were conventional threats from the former Soviet Union, as well as Russian nuclear weapons in other countries. Dr. Péczeli claimed that a large accomplishment from this NPR that holds significance today is the extension of the 1992 nuclear testing moratorium and navigation guidelines regarding how to maintain a nuclear arsenal without conducting underground tests. President Bush’s NPR from 2001 was similar to Clinton’s in that it focused on employment decisions and deterrence needs. However, Dr. Péczeli emphasized that Bush’s NPR included all the components of effective deterrence, including nuclear and non-nuclear offensive strike systems, active and passive defense, and infrastructure. Because there was no longer a bipolar system of threats to the US, the growing spectrum of contingency plans and the importance of arms control became pillars of this NPR. President Obama’s NPR from 2010 was extremely transparent and a true interagency review, as it kept allies involved and willing to buy in. Obama navigated the balance between the vision of a world without nuclear weapons and maintaining a secure and effective nuclear arsenal. Dr. Péczeli suggested that this NPR also laid some of the framework for President Trump’s NPR, as the threats emerging relied on strategic stability with Russia and China, two countries in which the US is competing with in 2018. Next, Dr. Péczeli outlined some of the main similarities between the NPRs, including a testing moratorium, deciding against a “no first use” policy, and continuing investments in the modernization of nuclear forces and their supporting infrastructure. She also identified some of the primary differences between these policies, including the difference in transparency and interagency involvement, the formal and informal approaches to arms control, and the strategic stability vs. competition declaratory policies. To conclude, Dr. Péczeli stated that as the security environment changes to face different challenges, there have been many different approaches and shifts of focus, but there has also been also a great degree of continuity on three levels: declaratory policy, force structure, and operational policy.
August 24, 2020
Dr. Péczeli
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SMA Speaker Series

Russia and the Expiration of the UN Arms Embargo on Iran

SMA hosted a speaker session presented by Dr. Mark Katz (George Mason University) as part of its SMA CENTCOM/EUCOM Speaker Series. Dr. Katz discussed UN Security Council Resolution 2231 (UNSCR 2231) in detail, which was adopted in support of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) (i.e., the Iranian Nuclear Accord of 2015). This resolution requires approval for certain types of weapons to be sold to Iran and is considered to be an embargo. This provision is dated to expire in October 2020, and Russia has expressed its intent to sell weapons to Iran immediately after. The US withdrew from the JCPOA in 2018 but is now introducing a Security Council resolution extending this arms embargo indefinitely on the grounds that the US is an original JCPOA signatory. Dr. Katz explained that if this resolution passes, all pre-2015 sanctions on Iran will return, which is unpopular amongst Russia and China. He argued that Russia is less concerned with selling weapons to Iran, but it is motivated to isolate the US from Europe and its Middle Eastern allies. Dr. Katz then explained that the results of the upcoming US presidential election may impact Russian behavior. If President Trump is reelected, Russia will likely exchange an extension of the JCPOA arms embargo for something valuable to them, such as an extension of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) due to expire in early 2021. However, if Biden is elected, Moscow may anticipate a US renewal of New START and rejoining of the JCPOA, giving Russia motivation to sell weapons to Iran before Biden is sworn in. Dr. Katz elaborated that Russia and Iran are both currently under US sanctions, so there is “not much to lose” if Russia chooses to sell and deliver weapons to Iran. On the other hand, a reason Russia may delay its selling of weapons to Iran relates to its desire to maintain good relations with itsother Middle Eastern allies, such as Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. Iran’s inability to pay for weapons coupled with these countries’ potential agreement of compensation towards Russia could decide which countries Russia chooses to sell to. Finally, Dr. Katz claimed that Russia may exploit divisions between the US and its other allies who continue to support the JCPOA to keep the US from doing the same for countries allied with Russia, adding that if the US were to point out Russia’s unreliability as an ally, smaller Middle Eastern countries may be more willing to support US policies instead.
August 17, 2020
Dr. Mark Katz
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SMA Speaker Series

Operationalising Deterrence in the Indo-Pacific

SMA hosted a speaker session presented by Dr. Ashley Townshend (University of Sydney), Dr. David Santoro (Pacific Forum), and Dr. Brendan Thomas-Noone (University of Sydney) as a part of its SMA STRATCOM Academic Alliance Speaker Series. Our speakers focused on the US-Australia Indo-Pacific deterrence dialogue, specifically with regards to China and conventional deterrence.
July 28, 2020
David Santoro, Brendan Thomas-Noone, and Ashley Townshend
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SMA Speaker Series

Scenario-based Planning to Maintain the Credibility of the U.S. Nuclear Deterrent Against Emerging Threats

SMA hosted speaker session presented by Amb. Ronald F. Lehman II (Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory [LLNL]) and Maj Gen (Ret) Bill Chambers (Institute for Defense Analyses [IDA]) as a part of its SMA STRATCOM Academic Alliance Speaker Series.
June 30, 2020
Amb. Ronald F. Lehman II and William A. Chambers
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SMA Speaker Series

A Stable Nuclear Future? The Impact of Autonomous Systems and Artificial Intelligence

SMA hosted a speaker session presented by Dr. Michael Horowitz (University of Pennsylvania) as a part of its SMA STRATCOM Academic Alliance Speaker Series. Dr. Horowitz began by explaining how nuclear technologies are shaping global politics. He used the global telegraph program, the Cuban missile crisis, the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, and the Chinese proliferation of drones as examples. He then focused on automation, autonomy, and artificial intelligence (AI). Dr. Horowitz defined AI as “the use of computers to simulate human behavior that requires intelligence.” AI is also broad, multi-purpose, dual use, and has a low barrier to entry. There are various methods of AI (e.g., symbolic vs. connectionist, machine learning, neural networks) and types of AI (e.g., narrow, general intelligence, superintelligence). Furthermore, AI is an enabler rather than a weapon. AI can direct physical objects, process data, and perform overall information management, but it is not a gun, nor is it a plane. The implication of this is that AI can be used for much broader purposes than military technologies. Next, Dr. Horowitz explained that individuals pursue autonomy and AI for their speed, precision, bandwidth/hacking capabilities, and decision making assistance. AI also has its downsides, however. Autonomous systems can be “brittle” (i.e., limited in terms of their potential areas of operation and requiring an immense amount of training). One must be weary of automation bias and trusting machines/algorithms too much to avoid making mistakes as well. Dr. Horowitz added that if a nation is already confident in its second-strike capabilities, over-trusting a machine is not necessarily worth the brittleness risks.
March 18, 2020
Michael Horowitz
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SMA Speaker Series

Why Deterrence Is Dead

SMA hosted a speaker session presented by Dr. James Lewis (Center for Strategic and International Studies [CSIS]) as a part of its SMA General Speaker Series. Dr. Lewis first stated that what the US signals and what China and Russia interpret those signals to mean are often entirely different. This constant misinterpretation is not new, however. Next, he explained that China and Russia also have found ways to circumvent US deterrence strategies and test the US’s limits (e.g., the Russian occupation of Crimea, Chinese activities in the South China Sea) for the past two decades.
March 3, 2020
James Andrew Lewis
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SMA Speaker Series

Hypersonic Weapons and Strategic Stability

SMA hosted a speaker session presented by Dr. Dean Wilkening (Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory) as a part of its SMA STRATCOM Academic Alliance Speaker Series. During his brief, Dr. Wilkening spoke about hypersonic weapons, crisis instability, and arms race instability. He began by defining ‘crisis instability’ as any action that makes escalation (across the nuclear threshold) harder to control and significantly reduces the effectiveness of a major power’s nuclear deterrent. He then defined ‘arms race instability’ as any action that stimulates an action-reaction arms competition. Dr. Wilkening proceeded to introduce hypersonic vehicles into the discussion. He classified ballistic missiles, hypersonic glide vehicles, and hypersonic cruise missiles as hypersonic weapons and highlighted two main missions for US hypersonic weapons: 1) penetrate advanced integrated air defense systems and 2) hold time-critical targets at risk. These uses of hypersonic weapons, however, can lead to arms race instability and/or crisis instability. Dr. Wilkening explained that arms race instability (and inadvertent escalation) could result from Russia and/or China modernizing their land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), investing in alternatives, or launching on warning or under attack. Crisis instability (and inadvertent escalation) could result from a compressed timeline, leading to less careful decision making, misperceptions, misunderstandings, miscommunication, and/or an increased chance for accidental or unauthorized attacks. Nuclear, warhead, and target ambiguity also play a role in making attack assessment difficult when performing hypersonic maneuvers. Lastly, Dr. Wilkening explained that the choice to use “long-range” or “tactical” weapons could lead to false perceptions of escalation. To conclude, Dr. Wilkening discussed how strategic instability can be avoided and presented a series of questions to ponder regarding to hypersonic weapons and strategic stability, including: 1) Will hypersonic weapons lead to offense dominance in strike warfare?; 2) How should the US balance the demands of conventional warfare with the need to maintain strategic stability with Russia and China?; and 3) How much strategic warning is prudent to assume for conflicts with Russia and China?
January 15, 2020
Dean A. Wilkening
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SMA Speaker Series

Cyber Deterrence or: How We Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Signal

SMA hosted a speaker session presented by Dr. Jonathan Welburn (RAND) as a part of its SMA General Speaker Series. Dr. Welburn began by discussing the current state of cyber space and cyber conflict. He then stated that the need for cyber deterrence has drawn key attention from US strategists. Dr. Welburn also highlighted the similarities and differences between classical and cyber deterrence, in addition to two key problems relevant to cyber deterrence: the attribution problem (attribution is often ambiguous after an attack has occurred) and the signaling problem (unlike conventional weapons, one cannot test cyber weapons or publicly display them, so it is often unclear as to what an actor’s cyber capabilities are). He then stated that within cyber deterrence, there is a specific defender strategy space, which reveals opportunities for deterrence through denial (e.g., deception, interdiction, patching) and punishment (e.g., public attribution, retaliation). He highlighted some of the current literature written on retaliation, which his team chose to focus on when designing its cyber deterrence game. Dr. Welburn then explained how his team designed this game, which involved two players: the attacker, who had the option to attack or not attack, and the defender, who had the options to signal or not signal and to retaliate or not retaliate. The attacker lacked perfect knowledge on the defender’s capability to punish by retaliation, which represented the signaling problem, while the defender lacked perfect knowledge of the attack’s occurrence and origin, which represented the attribution problem. After reviewing the attacker’s and defender’s incentives and how the game operated, Dr. Welburn presented his team’s key findings: 1) defenders should be deceptive of their true capabilities, 2) defenders should signal deceptively, 3) high attribution improves deterrence, and 4) increasing the cost of correct retaliation relative to incorrect retaliation improves deterrence. To conclude, Dr. Welburn stated that his team believes that cyber deterrence is possible, and deterrence by denial is ideal from a US cyber deterrence policy standpoint. However, he suggested that the DOD can improve its deterrence through an adversary-specific retaliation strategy, which would utilize both deception and signaling.
November 7, 2019
Jonathan W. Welburn, Justin Grana, and Karen Schwindt
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SMA Speaker Series

Game Theory Applications to 21st Century Deterrence

A hosted a speaker session presented by Mr. Damon Coletta (US Air Force Academy) as a part of its SMA STRATCOM Academic Alliance Speaker Series. During his brief, Mr. Coletta discussed game theory’s application to modern deterrence. He began by explaining the basics of game theory, highlighting that it evolves out of market-level analysis and adopts a set of economic assumptions regarding payoffs and strategy. He then stated that, when applied to deterrence, game theory can be used to assess whether there is an instrumental rationality behind an adversary’s actions, as well as what their rationality and/or preferences might be.
August 23, 2019
Damon Coletta
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SMA Speaker Series

Deterrence, Coercion, and Escalation Management vis-a-vis Iran: Lessons From Past Confrontations

SMA hosted a speaker session presented by Mr. Michael Eisenstadt (The Washington Institute for Near East Policy) as a part of its SMA CENTCOM Speaker Series. During his presentation, Mr. Eisenstadt discussed Iran’s strategic culture and ways of war. He explained that a nation’s strategic culture is shaped by its decision makers’ perception of the world and the actions they take to achieve their goals. Mr. Eisenstadt then stated that US media is currently fixated on the idea of a full-scale war with Iran and the potential for escalation; however, this focus is unwarranted because one of Iran’s primary goals, based on historical precedents such as the Iran-Iraq War, is to avoid major conflicts.
June 28, 2019
Michael Eisenstadt
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SMA Speaker Series

What Does Cognitive Bias Mean for Deterrence and the Ethics of Modern Deterrence

SMA hosted a speaker session presented by Mr. Iain King (Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)) as a part of its SMA General Speaker Series. Mr. King began by stating that there is currently no singular consensus definition of modern deterrence. Furthermore, the cases in which modern deterrence can be applied varies among individuals as well. He explained that modern deterrence encompasses both old-fashioned and nuclear deterrence, and focused on ten key characteristics that distinguish nuclear deterrence from all other types of deterrence, some of which include: 1) nuclear deterrence is incredibly binary (there are no degrees of attack or harm; you either use a nuclear weapon or you do not); 2) there are a small number of actors involved, all of who are known
June 25, 2019
Iain King
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SMA Speaker Series

Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) Iran Panel Discussion

During his portion of the discussion, Dr. Ostovar addressed the following questions: 1) Understanding that Iran wants to operate at a level below armed conflict, what actions by the US would be considered a redline for Iran and why? and 2) If armed conflict arises, where will Iran engage the US military forces and through what branch (Artesh, IRGC, IRGC Qods Force, Proxies)? Dr. Ostovar stated that Iran is operating in an environment that suggests that redlines have been crossed. These redlines are likely the US’s economic sanctions and its attempted oil embargo.
June 21, 2019
Dr. John Arquilla
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SMA Speaker Series

Exploring Space Deterrence: A Game Theoretic Model to Inform Future Strategies

SMA hosted a speaker session presented by Dr. Krista Langeland (RAND) as a part of its SMA STRATCOM Academic Alliance Speaker Series.
March 5, 2019
Langeland, K. (RAND)
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SMA Speaker Series

Deterrence in Cyberspace

SMA hosted a speaker session presented by Dr. Ethan Bueno de Mesquita (University of Chicago) as a part of its SMA STRATCOM Speaker Series. Dr. Bueno de Mesquita began by stating that although the US and its allies have tremendous cyber capacity, practitioners tend to believe that their strategic thinking is lagging behind.
March 1, 2019
Bueno de Mesquita, E. (University of Chicago)
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SMA Speaker Series

What Deters and Why: Exploring Effective Deterrence of Interstate Aggression

SMA hosted a speaker session presented by Dr. Michael Mazarr (RAND) as a part of its SMA General Speaker Series. Dr. Mazarr spoke about a recent RAND study, entitled “What Deters and Why: Assessing Requirements for Effective Deterrence.”
December 11, 2018
Mazarr, M. (RAND)
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NSI Publications (Tagged: Deterrence)

NSI Publication

A New US-Iran Nuclear Agreement: What are the Chances?

Most of the expert contributors agree that, though not a certainty, it appears likely that Iran will be willing to reengage in some form of nuclear negotiations with the United States at some point over the next five years.
Year Published:
2020
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NSI Publication

The Abraham Accords and Iran’s Unconventional Warfare Activities

The Abraham Accords normalizing diplomatic and economic relations between Israel and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Israel and Bahrain, as well as a less robust agreement with Sudan, represent a historic turning point for Israel. Together with the Camp David Accords (Egypt) and the 1994 Peace Accord (Jordan), the Abraham Accords bring to five the number of Arab states that have officially recognized Israel’s right to exist—a claim that states in the Gulf and Near East have denied since Israel was founded.
Year Published:
2020
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NSI Publication

NAS Space Defense and Protection Project

Dr. Allison Astorino-Courtois was selected to serve on the National Academy of Sciences’ National Security Space Defense and Protection project. The approximate start date for the project is December 15, 2014.
Year Published:
2014
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NSI Publication

Impact of NRC Strategic Deterrence Study

The most recent news on the impact of the National Academy of Sciences’ Deterrence study co-chaired by Dr. Allison Astorino-Courtois. The excerpt below is from the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) Report on this year’s National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2016.
Year Published:
2015
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